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INTRODUCTION

The combination of the complementary principles of trespass
and zoning law can be employed to fight crime on the streets of American cities. While the proper role of this collaboration, which this examination designates as "trespass-zoning," may be more legally
circumscribed than that cast by recent and innovative municipal ordinances, its potential effectiveness remains viable within constitutional
parameters. Whether trespass-zoning relies upon the same principles
thatjustify restricting an individual's freedom of movement in cases of
bail, parole, and probation, or simply upon the right to exclude-the
most essential of all property rights'-it can be used to legitimately
exclude those arrested for, or convicted of, drug-related offenses from
designated areas with significantly higher incidents of crime.
The separate aims of zoning and trespass principles lay the
groundwork for their seamless combination and ultimate employment
by several cities as an innovative crime control device. On its own,
zoning law has traditionally been implemented to dictate the acceptable uses of property within a particular zone. When combined with
trespass law, however, such zoning measures serve to dictate not
1 See, e.g.,
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) ("[O]ne of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property [is] the right to exclude others.").
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merely acceptable uses of property within a designated area, but also
acceptable users of that property. By identifying individuals, either by
name or criminal pedigree, cities employ "people-based zoning," making the presence of such individuals in designated zones punishable as
criminal trespass.
Two municipal methods of achieving these exclusions, and
thereby enabling neighborhood revitalization, have arisen in recent
years. The first finds city councils designating "drug exclusion zones"
in areas with significantly higher incidents of drug-related crime than
other areas similarly situated, where individuals arrested for, or convicted of, enumerated offenses may not tread. The second method
finds municipalities conveying the public streets and sidewalks of
those areas under criminal siege to local property owners so as to afford them the protections of trespass law by way of the property right
to exclude. In both cases, municipalities are beginning to enable
neighborhoods within their jurisdictions to control access to their
streets and common ways, thereby excluding all who cannot demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose for their presence.
Violation of either of these methods of trespass-zoning results in a
crime, criminal trespass, completely independent of the underlying
drug offense that qualifies individuals for exclusion. To be apprehended, the excluded individual need not engage in criminal activity,
nor even be suspected of it. Rather, it is the individual's mere presence in a particular area that offends. While the exclusion is predicated on a suspicion of sorts, derived from both the individual's
membership in a class of persons previously arrested for, or convicted
of, drug related crimes, as well as a recognition of the reality of recidivism, a probable cause belief that the excluded individual is committing a repeat offense at the time of apprehension is not required to
secure an arrest for running afoul of trespass-zoning.
It is important to note from the outset that this discussion on
exclusion does not compromise the higher quantum of probable
cause required to arrest an individual for the underlying, drug-related
offenses on which these exclusions are based. Indeed, a person apprehended for dealing or possessing illegal narcotics remains subject
to standard prosecution for such crimes, and may, in such cases, embrace the incumbent protections of probable cause in asserting a defense. Once legitimately seized for engaging in drug-related behavior
that merits a judicial determination of probable cause, however, the
individual becomes subject to the aggressive implementation of trespass principles in selected, crime-distressed areas, where it has been
predetermined that the person's presence incites such deleterious effects as to justify his or her exclusion.
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In Part I, this examination considers the complementary principles of zoning and trespass law in their combined application as tools
to counter drug-related crime in certain neighborhoods and public
housing developments within American cities, reviewing several examples of these trespass-zoning methods in action. While Part II explores the theoretical justifications for trespass-zoning as a crime
control device in crime-ridden neighborhoods, Part III tackles existing and potential legal challenges to these aggressive exclusionary
measures. Ultimately, this examination concludes that while municipalities may legitimately employ trespass-zoning through either of
these enumerated methods, neighborhood protection and revitalization may be optimized by conveying public streets in well-defined
neighborhoods to the property owners of those areas, thus allowing
them to eradicate the deleterious criminal element by exercising the
most fundamental property right in "the bundle" 2-the right to
exclude. 3
I.

THE CONCEPT OF TREsPAss-ZONING: COMBINING THE

COMPLEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF ZONING AND TRESPASS LAw
IN THE FIGHT ON CRIME

Two methods of trespass-zoning have arisen in recent years
through municipal efforts to combat drug crime in concentrated areas within their jurisdiction. The first method, the creation of "drug
exclusion zones," from which individuals suspected of, or convicted

for, drug-related offenses are excluded, has been implemented in
2 See, e.g., Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a CommunityBased Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773, 774 (2002).
The law has long used the metaphor of the bundle of sticks as a way to
describe and think about the nature of property, especially land. As signified by the bundle, ownership of land does not so much indicate title to a
physical portion of earth as it does the power to enforce certain rights in the
land. Collectively these rights make up the bundle-the sum total of rights
one can have with respect to a parcel of land. Conversely, the various rights,
the sticks in the bundle, can be disaggregated, with each stick amounting to
a property right.
Id.; see also Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REv. 1053, 1056 (1989).
Property ... is a "bundle of sticks." Within the "bundle," each "stick" represents a legally recognized right an individual may have with regard to some
thing, tangible or intangible.... The "bundle" is a metaphorical characterization of the aggregate of legally recognized rights of an individual in some
particular thing. My rights to sell, lease, give, and possess my house are the
sticks which together constitute the bundle.
Id.
3

See supra note 1.
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Portland, Oregon, and Cincinnati, Ohio. 4 The other method, the

conveyance of public streets and sidewalks by a municipality to the
property owners who live in the neighborhood in which those public
ways are located, has been attempted in Richmond, Virginia, and
Knoxville, Tennessee, between the cities and their respective public
housing authorities. 5 Derivations of the Richmond and Knoxville trespass policies, which are implemented by the housing authorities subsequent to the conveyance, can be found in public housing authorities
in Tampa, Florida, and El Paso, Texas. 6 Though the scope of this
examination focuses on trespass-zoning as applied by these cities, it is
the overarching viability of the basic elements of these methods, and
the principles upon which they are founded, that is the true subject of
concern. These six cities are progenitors of these unique and innovative measures. As such, the mechanics of their respective efforts to
implement this crime control device, as well as their successes and
failures, compel prominent attention when considering, ultimately,
the feasibility of extending trespass-zoning to other cities across the
United States.
A.

DrugExclusion Zones

While there are notable differences to be considered between the
two, including the actual name assigned to the zones, 7 the Portland
and Cincinnati ordinances delineating drug exclusion zones are
predominantly the same. This is due in large part to the fact that the
Cincinnati ordinance was patterned after its Portland counterpart.8
The Portland City Council, which pioneered such ordinances when
4 See CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755 (1999); PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20
(2003).
5 See Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2001) (adjudicating
Knoxville conveyance); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Va. 2002) (adjudicating Richmond conveyance), rev'd sub nom. Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191
(2003).
6 Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 548 (11th Cir. 1994) (adjudicating
Tampa Housing Authority's trespass policy); Vasquez v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 103 F.
Supp. 2d 927, 929 nn.1-2 (W.D. Tex. 2000), rev'd, 271 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2001), reh'g
granted en banc, 289 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2274 (2003) (adjudicating El Paso Housing Authority's trespass policy).
7 Portland City Code Chapter 14B.20 designates "drug-free zones," while Chapter 755 of the Cincinnati Municipal Code establishes "drug-exclusion zones." For purposes of this examination, the term "drug exclusion zones" will be used
interchangeably to convey the common trespass-zoning concept behind both the
Portland and Cincinnati ordinances.
8 Cincinnati, Ohio, Ordinance 229-1996, pmbl. (Sept. 6, 1996) (ordaining CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755).
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enacting Portland City Code Chapter 14.100 in 1995, 9 provides the
best description of a drug exclusion zone:
Drug-free zones are those areas of the City... where the number of
arrests [within a specified period prior to designation] where there
was probable cause to believe a person has committed [an offense
enumerated within the Code] . . .is significantly higher than that
for other similarly sized geographic areas of the City that are not
located within a drug-free zone. 10
While the constitutional parameters that may ultimately circumscribe
the breadth of the zones will be considered below, l l it suffices at this
point to focus the examination on the reach of the zones as currently
drafted.
What areas are designated as exclusion zones? In both Portland and
Cincinnati, the exclusion zones are areas of the city designated by the
City Council where the number of arrests for enumerated crimes is
"significantly higher than that for other similarly situated/sized areas
of the city."1 2 Both cities require that the zones be designated by ordi13
nance, and that designation is only valid for a limited period of time.
The designation may be extended for additional periods if necessary
or appropriate, 14 but the Cincinnati ordinance makes clear that "in
no event shall the total [period of designation] be more than ten
15
years" for any of its zones.
Who is excluded? Both the Portland and Cincinnati ordinances
specifically enumerate the drug-related offenses by which exclusion
zones are identified and for which individuals may be civilly excluded,
including, but not limited to, possession, distribution, and solicitation. 16 By linking the identification of problem areas and problem
makers, the ordinances attempt to assuage the problem symmetrically.
9

CODE

PORTLAND, OR., CODE

ch. 14.100 (1995) (current version at

PORTLAND, OR.,

ch. 14B.20).

10 PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.010 (2003).
11 See discussion infra Part III.A.4.b.
12 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-1; PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.010.
13 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-3 (requiring that drug-exclusion zones be designated by ordinance, and that said designation be valid for an initial period of two
years); PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.020 (requiring that drug-free zones be designated by ordinance, and that said designation be valid for three years).
14 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-3 (providing that the "council may extend the
time of designation as it deems appropriate"); PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.020
(instructing the Portland Chief of Police to report to Council ninety days before end
of designation period "as to whether there is a need to re-authorize or re-configure"
the enumerated zones).
15 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-3.
16 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-5; PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.030.
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While this examination limits its focus to drug-related offenses, city
councils could conceivably enumerate any offense they wish to eradi17
cate through civil exclusion.
A person "arrested or otherwise taken into custody" for any of the
drug-related offenses enumerated by the respective codes "is subject
to exclusion for a period of 90 days" from one or more, or possibly all,
drug exclusion zones.' 8 Both ordinances provide that subsequent
conviction for one of the enumerated offenses extends the individual's exclusion to one year. 19 The ordinances provide persons receiving an exclusion notice with a right to appeal the exclusion to
municipal officers within a defined period after issuance of the notice. 20 Under the Cincinnati ordinance, "the exclusion shall not take
effect during the pendency of the appeal."' 2' An excluded person
found within an exclusion zone is "subject to immediate arrest for
22
criminal trespass."
Who issues the exclusion? Both the Portland and Cincinnati ordi-

nances provide that the Chief of Police or his or her designees are "in
charge of the public streets, sidewalks, and public ways" of the exclusion zones "for purposes of issuing and directing the service of exclusion notices." 23 Such persons may issue the exclusions when a person
is arrested for one of the enumerated offenses. 24 The notice of exclusion must be in writing, specify the exclusion zones from which that
person is excluded, and "contain information concerning the right to
25
appeal the exclusion."
How broad are the zone variances? Along with the civil exclusion

provisions for those apprehended or convicted of committing enu17

For example, Portland also employs Prostitution-Free Zoning. See PORTLAND,

OR., CODE ch. 14B.30.

18 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-5 (stating that if a "person has been arrested
or taken into custody within any drug exclusion zone," he or she is excluded "from
the public streets, sidewalks, and other public ways in all drug exclusion zones designated" by the ordinance). But see PORTLAND, OR., CODE chs. 14B.20.030, 14B.20.050
(excluding individuals arrested for committing an enumerated offense within a drugfree zone from "one or more drug-free zones" subject to the discretion of the "Chief
of Police and/or designees").
19 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-5; PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.030.

20
21

CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch.

22

CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE

23

CINCINNATI,

CINCINNATI, OHIO,

OHIO,

CODE

755-11; PORTLAND,
ch. 755-11(2).

OR., CODE

ch. 14B.20.060.

ch. 755-5; PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.030.
CODE ch. 755-7; see also PORTLAND, OR., CODE

ch.

14B.20.040 (placing the Chief of Police of designee "in charge of the public rights of
way and parks in the drug-free zones").
24 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-9; PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.050.
25 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-9; PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.050.
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merated drug-related crimes, the ordinances also provide a list of exceptions, allowing excluded individuals with legitimate purposes to
enter the exclusion zones from which they are otherwise restricted.
While both the Portland and Cincinnati versions of the ordinance
provide that these variances, like the exclusion notices themselves,
may be issued by the "chief of police and/or designees," the Cincinnati ordinance authorizes certain social service agencies to issue them
as well. 26 The ordinances of both cities provide an expansive collec-

tion of reasons for which variances must be granted, allowing access to
excluded persons who have residential, employment, social service,
educational, or otherwise "essential" needs found only within a drug
exclusion zone. 27 Because the ordinances themselves provide for the
automatic issue of a variance to residents (implicitly including property owners) and business owners, the drug exclusion zones raise no
Fifth Amendment takings issues.
Furthermore, the drug exclusion zones have been lauded for
their effectiveness. "City officials say drug arrests [in one of Portland's
drug-free zones] have dropped to the point that the .

.

. zone is no

warranted." 28

longer
The Portland mayor's office maintains that,
when it comes to drug-free zones, there is no "better solution for providing relief to drug-affected hot spots." 29 Furthermore, "people living in those hotspots . . . want such enforcement."' 30 The City of
'
Cincinnati claims that the policy "cut[s] down on crime. "31
B.

Conveying Streets and Sidewalks to Local Property Owners

The second method of trespass-zoning utilized by municipalities
involves the enactment of ordinances by city councils conveying public, city-owned streets and sidewalks to local neighborhood property
owners. In turn, the local property owners, enabled by the convey26 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-11(b)(2); PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch.
14B.20.060(B) (1).
27 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-11 (b) (2) (stating that while it is mandatory
that police issue variances to those excluded individuals who establish residency of
employment within the zone, id. ch. 755-11 (b) (2) (a), (b), the police are given discretion in the issuance of variances for social services, id. ch. 755-11 (b) (2)); PORTLAND,
OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.060(B) (requiring that variances be issued to excluded individuals establishing residential, employment, social services, educational, or otherwise essential needs within the zone).
28 Robin Franzen, The "Softening" of Drug-Free Zones, OREGONIAN, May 15, 2002, at
D1.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Jan Crawford Greenburg, Top Court Limits Law on Disabled Workers; Seniority System May Overrule ADA, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 2002, at 1.
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ance to avail themselves of the right to exclude, set forth a trespass
policy extending to those newly acquired thoroughfares. Public housing authorities that manage developments enveloping such thoroughfares have been at the forefront of such transactions, and thus account
for the bulk of legal activity in this area. In addition, prominent scholars such as George W. Liebmann, Robert C. Ellickson, and Robert H.
Nelson have in the past decade provided proposals demonstrating the
potential for successful application of this strain of trespass-zoning to
preexisting private neighborhoods comprised of a multitude of individually owned units.
1. Conveying Thoroughfares to Public Housing Authorities
This "conveyance" strain of trespass-zoning has been attempted
by public housing authorities in both Richmond, Virginia, and Knoxville, Tennessee. In addition, public housing authorities in Tampa,
Florida, and El Paso, Texas, have implemented similar trespass policies extending beyond their complexes to the streets and sidewalks
that they envelop.
The Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority (Housing
Authority) maintained a public housing development for low-income
residents, comprised of several blocks within an area known as Whitcomb Court.3 2 This area had been described as "an open-air drug
market. ' 33 The City of Richmond owned the streets located within
the development, but in response to the inordinate level of drug
crime in the project, the City enacted an ordinance that "'closed to
public use and travel and abandoned as streets of the City of Richmond,' streets in Whitcomb Court because those streets were 'no
longer needed for the public convenience.' "34 "In an effort to eradicate illegal drug activity" by transforming the area into a quasi-gatedcommunity, " [t] he City conveyed the streets by a recorded deed to the
Housing Authority," leaving the Housing Authority "in its capacity as
owner of the private streets" to authorize the Richmond Police to
serve notice to any person found on the development's property
"when such person [was] not a resident, employee, or such person
[could] not demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose for
being on the premises." 35 To effectuate the exclusion of those who
did not have a legitimate purpose for entering the development, "in32
ginia
33
34
35

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Va. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Virv. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191 (2003).
Id.
Id. (quoting Richmond, Va., Ordinance 97-181-197 (June 23, 1997)).
Id.
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dividuals who sought access to the Housing Authority's property, including the streets, needed to obtain [a public housing authority
official's] permission for such access." 36 The teeth of the Housing Authority's trespass procedures was the "notice-barment rule," which authorized the Richmond Police "to arrest any person for trespassing
after such person, having been duly notified, either [remained] upon
37
or return [ed] to" any property owned by the Housing Authority.
A similar thoroughfare conveyance took place in Knoxville,
where, "[p] ursuant to statutory authorization, the City... leased to [a
public housing authority] certain interior streets and sidewalks within
the housing developments for one dollar per year. '38 As in Richmond, the Knoxville public housing authority instituted a no-trespass
' 39
policy "[t] o further address the problem of crime on its properties."
This no-trespass policy included "a list of individuals who [were] prohibited from entering" its premises, which, by virtue of the public
housing authority's lease with the city, extended to those streets and
sidewalks within the development. 40 The list was compiled by a housing authority official, who added names to the list "when he receive [d] 'reliable information' that an individual ha[d] been involved
in drug activities or violent criminal activities. '41 Accordingly, "officers [were] instructed by [the public housing authority] to arrest any
individual found on [its] property whose name [was] on the no-tres4
pass list." 2

Public housing authorities in Tampa, Florida, and El Paso, Texas,
have employed similar trespass policies. The Tampa Housing Authority limited access to one of its properties "to residents, invited guests of
residents, and those conducting official business," and
"[e]nforcement of this limited access policy [was] accomplished
43
through enforcement of Florida's trespass after warning statute.
Thereafter,
the Tampa Police Department [was] authorized by the Housing Authority to issue warnings to persons, trespassing upon Housing Authority property. Once an individual [has been] issued a trespass
36
37
38
39

Id.
Id.
Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 403.

40

Id. at 403-04.

41
42

Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.

43

Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 548 (11 th Cir. 1994).
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warning, he [would be] placed on a list and [would be] subject to
44
arrest if found on Housing Authority property again.
While "the City-owned streets and sidewalks surrounding and intersecting with the Housing Authority property [remained] open to the
public,"' 45 the Tampa Housing Authority's trespass policy remains an
apposite example of a measure enabling a local property owner to
exercise the property right to exclude. Likewise, in defense of its residents' security, a public housing authority in El Paso implemented a
similar "trespass after warning" policy extending to the "walks, ways,
playgrounds, parking lots, drives and other common areas of the de'46
velopment premises.
The effect of the trespass policies utilized by public housing authorities in these four cities has been positive. The "undisputed" purpose of the trespass policy developed by the Richmond Housing
Authority was to "to create a safe, drug-free environment for the residents" of the public housing development, 4 7 and early indicators
from similar measures in other cities suggest this is a goal well within
reach. For example, the Tampa Housing Authority's application of
Florida's criminal trespass statute to its premises successfully "decreased the number of non-residents engaging in criminal activity on
48
Housing Authority property."
2.

Conveying Thoroughfares to Preexisting Neighborhoods-The
Inner City Gated Community

Expounding upon a proposition first advanced by George Liebmann in 1993, Robert H. Nelson proposed the "enactment of legislation to facilitate the establishment of neighborhood associations in
existing neighborhoods." 49 According to Professor Nelson, such legislation would enable the creation of private neighborhoods that could
ultimately "administer the collective controls over neighborhood qual44 Id. at 548.
45 Id. at 548 n.3.
46 Vasquez v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 103 F. Supp. 2d 927, 929 nn.1-2 (W.D. Tex.
2000), rev'd, 271 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2001), reh'ggranteden banc, 289 F.3d 350 (5th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2274 (2003).
47 Commonwealth v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674, 685 (Va. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191 (2003).
48 Daniel, 38 F.3d at 550.
49 Robert H. Nelson, Privatizingthe Neighborhood: A Proposalto Replace Zoning With
Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods,7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 827, 828,
858 (1999) (citing George W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and Block
Associations, 25 URB. LAw. 335 (1993)).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 79:1

ity now exercised through land use controls at the municipal level. 50
This legislation could include the "transfer of ownership of municipal
streets, parks, swimming pools, tennis courts, and other existing public lands and facilities located within the proposed newly private
neighborhood" to a newly elected neighborhood association which
would be vested with the responsibility to effect neighborhood quality
controls. 5 1 Such a "privatization of zoning" would allow these associations "precise control over neighborhood character. '52 This character
control, as Professor Nelson posits, could extend to the neighborr
hood's criminal element, enabling inner city residents "to exclude
criminals, hoodlums, drug dealers, truants, and others who undermine the possibilities for a peaceful and vital neighborhood existence
53
there."
Professor Robert C. Ellickson furthers the ideas of Nelson and
Liebmann, proposing the design of "new micro-institutions for old
neighborhoods" called "Block Improvement Districts," or "BLIDs,"
that would "enable [residents] to take collective action at the block
level."'54 By allowing the residents of these preexisting neighborhoods
to exercise the right to exclude, the municipalities simultaneously enable their police to protect, and ultimately revitalize, those neighborhoods by enforcing the property rights of those residents through
criminal trespass law.
With these practical uses of civil exclusion in mind, the examination turns to the principles upon which the combined application of
trespass and zoning laws is based.
11.

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TRESPASS-ZONING AS A CRIME
CONTROL DEVICE

There exists a widely held and largely unquestioned belief in an
unfettered freedom of movement, to which the idea of trespass-zoning
may seem anathema. Such platitudes should give way, however, to the
need to revitalize crime-ridden neighborhoods. Namely, allowance
must be made for measures that legitimately embrace and combine
the complimentary principles of zoning and trespass law for the purpose of returning these crime-ridden neighborhoods to both physical
50
51
52
53

Id. at 829.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 828.
Id. at 865 (citing James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighbor-

hood Safety: Broken Windows, ATLANTIC

MONTHLY,

Mar. 1982, at 29).

54 Robert C. Ellickson, New Institutionsfor Old Neighborhoods, 48 DuKE L.J. 75,
76-77 (1998).
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and social order. A look at the aims of both of these principles reveals
how each lends itself to the other when applied together to fight
crime and revitalize communities.
A.

"Broken Windows"--The Tie That Binds Trespass and Zoning Law

Traditional zoning law prescribes a physical order to a particular
zone by dictating acceptable uses of land within that zone. 55 Zoning
law preserves preferred "physical" characteristics and order of neighborhoods by designating areas for a particular kind of physical order
and use, thereby restricting all other kinds of uses. 56 Traditional trespass principles, on the other hand, designate those members of society permitted to be in a particular area for the purpose of preserving
social order and property rights. 5 7 By dictating which members of so-

ciety have access to a designated area, trespass law supports private
property owners in restricting and excluding the presence of others.
Essentially, zoning restricts uses within a designated zone to preserve physical order, and trespass law restricts access to a designated
55 City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732 (1995) ("Land-use
restrictions designate 'districts in which only compatible uses are allowed and incompatible uses are excluded.' These restrictions typically categorize uses as single-family
residential, multiple-family residential, commercial, or industrial.") (quoting DANIEL

R.

MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW

§ 4.16, at 113-14 (3d ed. 1993), and citing id. § 1.03, at

4; 1 E.C. YoKLEv, ZONING LAw AND PRACTICE § 7-2, at 252 (4th ed. 1978); 1 E.ZIEGLER,
JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 8.01, at 8-2 to 8-3 (4th ed.
1995)).
56 Id. at 732-33 ("Land-use restrictions aim to prevent problems caused by the
'pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.' In particular, reserving land for singlefamily residences preserves the characterof neighborhoods .. ") (emphasis added) (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
57 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886).
The great end for which men entered into society was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances
where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the
good of the whole ....
[E]very invasion of private property, be it ever so
minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my
license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing .. ..
Id. (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (C.P. 1765) (Camden,
L.CJ.)); see also Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 190-91 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that trespass law across the nation "not only recognizes the legitimacy of [private property owners'] insistence that strangers keep off their land, but
subjects those who refuse to respect their wishes to the most severe of penaltiescriminal liability"); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12, 153 (1978) ("[P]roperty
rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's authority to act as he wishes in
certain areas," and "[o]ne of the main rights attaching to property is the right to
exclude others.") (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1-*15).
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zone to preserve social order. Though the two separate property principles have developed to protect two separate ends, those ends are in
no way inapposite. James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling's "Broken
Windows" theory of crime postulates that the loss of preferred physical
order, through vandalism and other quality of life crimes, may not
only result in a change in the physical character of the land, but may
also have the deleterious effect of social disorder that escalates to the
commission of more serious crimes. 58 Thus, according to Wilson and
Kelling, physical order and social order are inextricably intertwined,
in that by restoring physical order, cities may restore social order.
Recent municipal measures employing trespass principles that
dictate which persons may be permitted to use property in designated
areas simply seek to extinguish those catalysts identified by the "Broken Windows" theory of crime. The presence of drug dealers who
flagrantly conduct their nefarious trade under the clear blue sky reflects both social disorder and physical disorder. Their presence becomes a sort of fixture within the neighborhood, their availability as
certain as the houses on the block. The deleterious effects of such
miscreants are two-fold: the social disorder they actively inflict, and
the social disorder they passively inspire. It is this second effect that
rightly merits the classification of the troublemakers themselves as
"broken windows." In an effort to break this self-perpetuating cycle
toward social disorder and improve the streets for the innocent victims that reside within these areas, municipalities have begun to treat
the troublemakers themselves as "broken windows" to be fixed. Their
repair entails their removal and exclusion.
The "Broken Windows" theory, in its call to make neighborhoods
less hospitable to social disorder by preserving physical order, naturally lends itself to the restrictive and exclusionary principles of both
zoning and trespass law. Linked by the "Broken Windows" theory,
zoning laws and trespass laws find complementary roles in the fight
against street crime, leading to recent city measures to employ what
can best be termed "trespass-zoning," whereby it is not merely the use
or physical order of a particular area which the zoning ordinances restrict, but also the users and social order of that area.
B.

Distinguishing Trespass-Zoningfrom Banishment

The exclusion of criminals from defined areas may call to mind
the controversial measure of banishment. Pawning off an area's criminal element to a neighboring area has been criticized as an injustice
58 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken
Windows, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 32.
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to those neighbors and as a pseudo-solution that fails to address the
root causes of crime. 59 Any asserted injustice to neighboring areas
must be tempered, however, by the manner in which these exclusion
zones are designated. As discussed above, exclusion zones are designated by their higher incidence of crime. In contrast, neighboring
areas with fewer incidents of crime maintain a greater appearance of
social and physical order, providing little to no encouragement for
the displaced criminal element to relocate their trade. 60 Thus, to
avoid the injustice of burdening ill-equipped neighborhoods with individuals who pose a deleterious threat, the excluded persons should
not merely be excluded from the exclusion zone in which they were
apprehended, but from all exclusion zones in the city that, by designation, suffer from high crime rates as well.6 1 Of course, civil exclusion
does not address pertinent issues of narcotics supply and demand that
plague the war on drugs. While excluding drug criminals from certain areas may not arrest their criminal activities, it will, by forcing
them into areas better equipped to meet their illegal behavior, make
it harder for them to do business. Civil exclusion not only flushes
criminals out into the light of day where they may be more readily
apprehended, but it also allows those more crime-ridden neighborhoods to resuscitate themselves as they become, like their neighbors,
less hospitable to crime.
Furthermore, exclusion may be distinguished from banishment.
Whereas banishment has historically been considered a criminal penalty or a form of punishment, exclusionary zoning is best classified as a
civil sanction. As discussed below, this distinction is quite important
in considering the double jeopardy issues raised by such ordinances.
The divergence turns not only on the definitional differences between
the two concepts, but also in the professed aims of their proponents.
While banishment serves to "promote the traditional aims of punishment, i.e. retribution and deterrence," the exclusion zones seek "to
59

Win. Garth Snider, Banishment: The History of Its Use and a Proposalfor Its Aboli-

tion Under the First Amendment, 24 NEw ENG. J. ON CrIM. & CRI. CONFINEMENT 455, 458
(1998) ("Banishment does nothing to solve the problems of crime, but merely forces
the criminal element and the attendant root cause of crime upon another
community.").
60 Wilson & Kelling, supra note 58, at 29, 32.
61 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-5 (1999) (excluding "person[s] [that] ha[ve]
been arrested or taken into custody within any drug exclusion zone" from "the public
streets, sidewalks, and other public ways in all drug exclusion zones designated" by the
ordinance). But see PORTLAND, OR., CODE chs. 14B.20.030, 14B.20.050 (2003) (excluding individuals arrested for committing enumerated offenses within a drug-free
zone from "one or more drug-free zones" subject to the discretion of the "Chief of
Police and/or designees").
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achieve legitimate civil goals" in response to the reality that "drug activities contribute [ ] to the degradation of the designated areas and
halve] a negative effect on the quality of life for the residents, businesses, and visitors." 62 This "degradation" undermines civil interests,
raising "[c]oncerns about property values and citizens' quality of
life." 63 Recognition of these legitimate ends emphasizes not only the
correlation between social and physical disorder upon which trespasszoning and the "Broken Windows" theory of crime are based, but also
the aim of the drug exclusion zones as civil protection rather than
criminal punishment, ultimately setting this civil exclusion apart from
64
banishment.
III.

THE LEGITIMATE SCOPE OF TRESPASS-ZONING: OVERCOMING
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO MUNICIPAL ATTEMPTS TO EXCLUDE
THE DELETERIOUS ELEMENT

A.

The Propriety and Limits of Drug Exclusion Zones

While the effectiveness of the drug exclusion zones on the streets
has been lauded, their reception in courtrooms has been tepid. The
Courts of Appeals of Oregon have upheld the Portland ban on several
occasions, but, in so doing, have gradually narrowed its scope. 65 Until
recently, there had been no cases allowing the Oregon courts to reach
the constitutionality of the Portland ban. 66 Furthermore, in light of
62 State v. James, 978 P.2d 415, 420 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Hudson v. United
States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)). The distinction between civil and criminal punishment, and the zones' proper classification as civil exclusion, is explored further in
Part III.A.1, with respect to double jeopardy challenges.
63 Id.
64 See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
65 State v. Collins, 39 P.3d 925, 930 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the drugfree zone ordinance requires that the police first request that an excluded person
leave the zone before arresting the individual for criminal trespass); State v. Vaughn,
28 P.3d 636, 640 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that drug-free zone restrictions did not
apply to a plea agreement requiring defendant to stay out of drug-free zones because
it was uncertain whether excluded individual was apprehended for underlying drug
offense within a drug-free zone-accordingly, excluded individual's entry into drugfree zone constituted a probation violation rather than a criminal act).
66 The Portland exclusion zones recently came under "right to travel" fire when a
Multnomah County Circuit Court judge found the ordinance in contravention of this
purported constitutional right in October 2002. Ashbel S. Green, Drug-FreeZone Law
Violates Right to Travel, Judge Rules, OREGONIAN, Oct. 18, 2002, at C6. Prior to this
ruling, the closest that the Oregon courts had come to reaching the constitutionality
of the Portland drug exclusion zone ordinance had been Frederick v. Portland,38 P.3d
288, 290 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), in which the constitutional challenges to the ordinance
were found moot because the order of exclusion no longer applied to the petitioner.
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the courts' narrowing of the council's ordinance, debate within the
Portland City Council over the scope of the drug-free zone ordinance
67
is ongoing.
Though Chapter 755 of the Cincinnati Municipal Code was patterned after the Portland ordinance when enacted in September
1996, it has met with far greater judicial resistance. Unlike the courts
in Oregon, the Ohio courts have had occasion to reach the constitutional issues raised by this strain of trespass-zoning. The Cincinnati
Code has been struck down outright by not only the U.S. District
Court in Johnson v. City of Cincinnati,68 but also by the Supreme Court

of Ohio in State v. Burnett.69 The district court found that the Code's
exclusion of a grandmother from her daughter and grandchildren,
and a homeless person from his essential social services, amounted to
violations of their constitutional rights to freedom of association, freedom of travel, and freedom from double jeopardy.70 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on the freedoms of travel and
71
association, but did not reach the double jeopardy challenge.
Though the Supreme Court of Ohio determined under principles of
federalism that it was not compelled to follow the federal district
court's prior pronouncements on the U.S. Constitution, it nevertheless reached most of the same conclusions in its disposition of another
excluded defendant's challenge to the Code, finding that Chapter 755
violated the defendant's right to intrastate travel and exceeded the
local authority granted to municipalities by the Ohio Constitution to
72
enact laws that do not conflict with the Ohio General Assembly.
As the status of these exclusion ordinances suggests, the legal
challenges to these zones have been many and various. The exclusion
zones have been subject to several procedural attacks, including the
legitimacy of arresting an excluded individual without first requesting
that the individual leave the zone, 73 and the propriety of civil exclu67 Robin Franzen, Changes Debated in Exclusion Zones, OREGONILAN, Sept. 27, 2002,
at B3.
68 119 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Ohio 2000), affd, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
69 755 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio 2001).
70 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 744, 747, 749. On the constitutional origins of
these freedoms see U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb"), discussion infra Part III.A.2
(freedom of association), and discussion infra Part III.A.3 (freedom of movement).
71 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 504-05, 505-06, 506 n.10 (6th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
72 Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 863, 867, 868.
73 See, e.g., State v. Collins, 39 P.3d 925, 930 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the
drug-free zone ordinance requires that the police first request that an excluded per-
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sion measures enacted at the municipal, rather than state, level. 74
While these procedural objections are well-taken and their resolution
essential in charting the legitimate implementation of exclusionary
zoning, this examination will focus on those constitutional provisions'
potentially implicated by zone enforcement that threaten to render
these aggressive measures inoperative. Indeed, whether these zones
stand or fall rests on their ability to navigate properly the right to freeson leave the zone before arresting the individual for criminal trespass). The Collins
ruling has significantly hamstrung Portland police who, as a result, "can only arrest
previously excluded people if they first refuse an officer's order to leave. If the banished comply, only to return to the zone again a short while later, the game begins all
over again." Franzen, supra note 28, at Dl. The Oregon courts' whittling down of the
exclusion zones has not escaped the attention of the targeted criminal element either, as "even drug buyers and sellers know that the city's once powerful landmark
zones aren't as mighty as they used to be, thanks to a couple of recent legal rulings
that have undercut police enforcement and caused drug activity in the area to resurge." Id. To circumvent this seemingly endless "game" imposed by the Oregon
Court of Appeals, the Portland City Council in May, 2002, began considering a proposal to create a new crime-"the crime of violating an ordinance." Id.
74 The only ground on which the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously agreed in
striking down Cincinnati's exclusion ordinance was that the City Council's measure
"exceed[ed] the local authority granted to the city by" its state constitution. Burnett,
755 N.E.2d at 868. The purported power usurpation turned on whether exclusion
constituted banishment, and thus ultimately criminal punishment. The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Cincinnati City Council, by enacting the drug exclusion
ordinance, had authorized a punishment (exclusion) for a state statute (that statute
criminalizing the underlying and enumerated drug-related offense for which the excluded defendant was originally convicted) that had not been provided for by that
state statute. Id. ("By authorizing a punishment not provided by statute for violation
of a statute, Cincinnati's drug exclusion ordinance has permitted something that is
prohibited under the state criminal code."). The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that
because exclusion is tantamount to banishment, and "banishment is historically considered to be punishment," exclusion is therefore a form of punishment (i.e., criminal penalty). Id. (citing Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 474 (1977)).
Having equated exclusion with punishment, the Ohio Supreme Court held such action by the City Council as ultra vires, because "there is no authority for the proposition that a municipality may, by way of ordinance, add a penalty for a violation of a
state criminal statute that is not otherwise provided for by the [state legislature]." Id.
For that reason, the court held the ordinance invalid under the Ohio Constitution.
As this ruling was based on the flawed equating of zone exclusion with banishment,
see discussion infra Part III.A.I., city councils such as Cincinnati's should remain free
to employ exclusionary zoning without exceeding their local, state prescribed, authority. Indeed, the Ohio Court of Appeals had embraced this distinction between exclusion and criminal penalty in its ill-fated Burnett decision. State v. Burnett, No. C981003, 2000 WL 955614 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1999) (rejecting the defendant's
state constitutional challenge "insofar as it is dependent upon a characterization of
Chapter 755's exclusion as a criminal penalty"), rev'd, 755 N.E.2d 857 (Ohio 2001).
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dom from double jeopardy, the right to freedom of association, and
the purported right to intrastate travel.
1.

The Double Jeopardy Challenge

Establishing the distinction between exclusion and banishment is
crucial in resolving challenges to exclusion ordinances under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that
"[n]o person . . . [shall] be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb. '75 In Johnson, the excluded individual
argued before the district court that the "exclusion . . . constitutes
criminal punishment," and as such:
[It] would constitute double jeopardy to convict and punish a person for the underlying drug offense after issuing the ninety day exclusion notice to him or her. Similarly, it would constitute double
jeopardy to issue the one year exclusion notice to a person who has
76
been convicted and sentenced for the underlying drug offense.
The federal district court noted in ruling on the Cincinnati ordinance
that "[t]he critical issue in determining whether the prohibition
against double jeopardy applies to . . . exclusion ordinance[s] is
77
whether the exclusion is a criminal or a civil punishment.
For the purposes of a double jeopardy challenge, the U.S. Su-

preme Court in Hudson v. United States78 and United States v. Ward7 9 set
forth a two-prong test for determining "[w] hether a particular punishment is criminal or civil." 80 Using statutory construction, a court must
first determine whether the punishment was "expressly or impliedly"
intended to be criminal or civil.8 1 If the court finds that the lawmaking body intended the measure to be a civil punishment, it must "inquire[ ] further [to ascertain] whether the statutory scheme was so
punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention." 82 In
applying this Hudson/ Ward analysis, the district court in Johnson
found that though the Cincinnati City Council "expressly intend[ed]
for exclusion to be a civil remedy," the drug exclusion ordinance
75 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
76 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 747 (S.D. Ohio 2000), affd,
310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003). The Sixth Circuit
did not reach the double jeopardy issue. See Johnson, 310 F.3d at 506 n.10.
77 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 747.
78 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
79 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
80 Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99.
81 Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)).
82 Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (citing Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617-21
(1960)).
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failed the second prong of the analysis because it "is analogous to banishment, a penalty historically regarded as punishment," thus negating all intentions the City Council may have had in making exclusion
a civil remedy. 83 Accordingly, the lower Johnson court found that the
84
exclusion ordinance impermissibly constituted double jeopardy.
In coming to its conclusion, the Johnson court explicitly declined
to follow the Oregon Court of Appeals, which in State v. James8 5 found
a distinction between exclusion and banishment. James also applied
the Hudson/ Ward analysis, but reached a dramatically different conclusion that the Johnson court refused to follow. In ruling on a double
jeopardy challenge to the ninety-day exclusion provision of the Cincinnati ordinance's Portland counterpart, the Oregon Court of Appeals found that the exclusion provision did not constitute
punishment, but rather was a civil sanction. It came to this conclusion
by refusing to equate the exclusion with banishment, noting that
" [b] anishment ... has traditionally been '[s]ynonymous with exilement or deportation, importing a compulsory loss of one's country.' "86 The exclusion at issue here is different from banishment,
according to the Oregon Court of Appeals, because exclusion "is of
limited duration" and, due to the broad variances made available by
the ordinance, "does not involve the loss of one's country or even
one's place of residence or one's ability to carry out lawful business
within the drug-free zones. '8 7 The James court further distinguished
exclusion from punishment by noting that the ends of the drug exclusion zone ordinance were not "to promote the traditional aims of punishment, i.e. retribution and deterrence," but rather "to achieve
legitimate civil goals" in response to city findings that "drug activities
contributed to degradation of the designated areas and had a negative
effect on the quality of life for the residents, businesses, and visitors."8 8 Recognition of these goals recalls the "Broken Windows" cor-

relation between social and physical disorder that trespass-zoning
seeks to redress, and properly places exclusionary zoning ordinances
in the context of neighborhood revitalization as opposed to criminal
banishment.
While accepting the proposition that banishment historically constitutes a criminal penalty, the James court's distinction between ban83 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (citing Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425, 474 (1977)).
84 Id. at 749.
85 978 P.2d 415 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
86 James, 978 P.2d at 419 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 131 (5th ed. 1979)).
87 Id. at 419.
88 Id. at 420 (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)).
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ishment and exclusion leaves the drug exclusion zones beyond double
jeopardy reproach, denying exclusion criminal penalty categorization.
Accordingly, the James court found that the drug exclusion zone ordinance did not violate the double jeopardy provisions of either the federal or Oregon state constitution. Indeed, the reasoning of the
Oregon Court of Appeals in James on the exclusion/banishment distinction was recently confirmed in a related ruling by the Oregon Supreme Court, which held in State v. Lhasawa that the Portland
prostitution-free zone ordinance8 9 does not violate double jeopardy. 90
2.

The Freedom of Association Challenge

The Cincinnati drug exclusion zone ordinance was also attacked
as an infringement upon the constitutional right to freedom of association in both Johnson and Burnett. In each, the challenge met with
varied results. As the federal district court in Johnson makes clear,
"The right to freedom of association is not enumerated in the Constitution, but arises as a necessary concomitant to the Bill of Right's [sic]
protection of individual liberty." 9 1 The U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncements on the freedom of association have found that the freedom protects (1) "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationships" as "a fundamental element of personal liberty,"
and (2) "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment" as "an indispensable means
of preserving other individual liberties." 9 2 In examining the "as applied" freedom of association challenge to the ordinance, the federal
district court in Johnson considered whether the plaintiffs' ability to
"maintain certain intimate human relationships" was implicated. 93
The U.S. Supreme Court provided "some relevant limitations on the
[certain intimate human] relationships that might be entitled to this
sort of constitutional protection," focusing on "personal affiliations
that ... attend the creation and sustenance of a family." 94
Both Johnson courts found that, as applied to the plaintiff grandmother and plaintiff homeless person, the drug exclusion zones impermissibly impaired their abilities to maintain protected
relationships, such as assisting in the raising of grandchildren and ac89 PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.30 (2003).
90 State v. Lhasawa, 55 P.3d 477, 488 (Or. 2002).
91 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 741 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
92 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
93 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 741 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18).
94 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
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cessing social services. 95 Noting that the right to freedom of association is not absolute, the lower Johnson court nonetheless went on to
find that the exclusion ordinance was not "narrowly tailored to serve
96
compelling state interests" and therefore unconstitutional.
Consideration of whether these ordinances are indeed "narrowly
tailored to serve compelling state interests" will be revisited in conjunction with the right to intrastate travel challenge. Both there and
here in the context of freedom of association, it is important to note
the crucial role variances play in narrowly tailoring the drug exclusion
zones to meet compelling state interests. The proper drafting of
broad variances that envelop legitimate purposes could vitiate the ordinances' purportedly improper implication of constitutional rights.
As to the homeless plaintiff in Johnson, the broader provisions of the
Portland exclusion ordinance include not only a "social services variance," but also an "essential needs variance," which, along with access
to social services, should be read to include, among other things, access to counsel. 9 7 Furthermore, it is possible to envision the drafting
of a variance that would allow for extended family member visitation
that would cover the otherwise implicated plaintiff grandmother. In
the absence of such variances protecting familial relationships and
First Amendment related activities, the Cincinnati drug exclusion
zone ordinance, according to the Johnson courts, was not narrowly tailored to its compelling governmental interest, and thus was unconstitutional as applied. On the other hand, as will be discussed below,
proper analysis of the exclusion ordinances under a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard obviates these freedom of association
concerns, strict scrutiny, and, as will be seen, implication of the purported right to intrastate travel.
Furthermore, the extent of damage inflicted upon the Cincinnati
ordinance by the Johnson ruling on freedom of association is limited
insofar as the Sixth Circuit and the federal district court accepted the
plaintiffs' challenge only "as applied." As opposed to a successful facial challenge that would have incapacitated the ordinance in its entirely, the associational challenge presented in Johnson merely
prompted the court to find that the ordinance interfered with protected relationships as applied to the excluded plaintiffs appearing
95 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 742; Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484,
504-05 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
96 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 742 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
720-21 (1997)); id. at 743-44.
97 PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.060(B)(3) (2003) (essential needs variance);
id. ch. 14B.20.060(B) (5) (social services variance).
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9
8 This was made clear when the Ohio Supreme Court in
before it.
Burnett rejected the excluded plaintiff's freedom of association claim
as a facial-overbreadth challenge. After examining issues of federalism and concluding that it was not bound by the federal district
court's Johnson ruling, the Ohio Supreme Court held:

On its face, the ordinance does not prohibit or interfere with fundamental, personal relationships. Nor does the ordinance facially infringe the rights of a citizen to associate with other citizens for the
purpose of engaging in protected First Amendment activities. Instead, the ordinance simply prohibits access to [the drug exclusion
zone] .99

Having rejected the plaintiff's facial challenge to the ordinance, the
court went on to reject potential "as applied" challenges as well, concluding that "because the ordinance prohibits access only to a particular area of the city .... [it] does not burden the right of association
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution."' 00
3.

The Right to Intrastate Travel Challenge

The drug exclusion zones have also been challenged as an impermissible burden on the purported constitutional "right to intrastate
travel." The Cincinnati ordinance was struck down as a violation of
this right in both the Ohio Supreme Court's Burnett decision and the
Ohio federal district court ruling in Johnson. The Portland exclusion
zones recently came under "right to travel" fire when a Multnomah
County Circuit Court judge found the ordinance in contravention of
the purported constitutional right in October 2002.101 But before
considering whether the exclusion zones contravene, or even implicate, the right to intrastate travel, it must first be determined whether
such a right even exists.
a.

The Dubious Existence of a Fundamental Right to Intrastate
Travel

"The word 'travel' is not mentioned within the text of the Constitution."10 2 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has found the right to
98 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 744; Johnson, 310 F.3d at 506.
99 State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 863 (Ohio 2001).
100

Id.

101
102

Green, supra note 66, at C6.
Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 865.

350
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travel from state to state to be constitutionally protected. 10 3 The Burnett and Johnson courts both went a step further, holding not only that
the right to travel exists, but also that the right protects intrastatetravel
as well. The Burnett court found "the right of travel is most likely protected from state interference by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 10 4 If so, then the issue properly becomes
"whether the asserted right [to intrastate travel] is 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental." 10 5 By analyzing the legitimacy of the well-established right to
interstate travel in substantive due process terms, the Ohio Supreme
Court availed itself of an opportunity to extend that interstate right to
include the right to intrastate travel as well, finding "the right to travel
within a state is no less fundamental than the right to travel between
10 6
the states.'
The Ohio Supreme Court's attempt to stretch the well-recognized right to interstate travel to include a right to intrastate travel by
extending substantive due process analysis must fail. To constitute a
"fundamental right" under due process, the putative freedom must be
"'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.'" 10 7 Indeed, the right to travel arguably satisfies both of these requirements. The U.S. Supreme Court
decisions in Washington v. Glucksberg'0 8 and Saenz v. Roe'0 9 suggest,
however, that the general right to travel and substantive due process
in fact have nothing to do with each other, thus rendering attempts to
root the freedom of movement in substantive due process groundless.
103 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969), overruled on other grounds by
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and
our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or
restrict this movement.
Id.
104 Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 864 (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958);
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900)).
105 Id. (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (quoting Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))).
106 Id. at 865.
107 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325,
326 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
108 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
109 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court was presented with a substantive
due process challenge to a state statute banning assisted suicide.I" 0 In
ruling that there was no fundamental right to assistance in committing suicide, the Court listed specific freedoms specially protected by
the Due Process Clause. ' 1 ' Conspicuously absent from this list of substantive due process freedoms is the right to travel. As Justice Cook
stated in her concurring opinion to Burnett, "Glucksber's list appears
to be exhaustive" and the "omission [of the right to travel] strongly
suggests that the right to travel is not one of the fundamental liberties
' 12
subjected to heightened scrutiny under substantive due process."'
Nor has the U.S. Supreme Court, when elucidating the possible
constitutional sources of the right to travel, identified substantive due
process as one of those sources. In Saenz v. Roe, the Supreme Court
considered "the validity of a California statute that limited the level of
welfare benefits available to California residents who had only recently
moved to the state."' 13 Though the right to interstate travel had been
recognized as a constitutional right prior to Roe, 114 the Supreme
Court "had been less than clear about the textual source of that right
in the Constitution." 1 5 The Court in Roe took strides to clarify the
110
111

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723-28.
Id.at 720.
[I] n addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights [1]
to marry, [21 to have children, [3] to direct the education and upbringing of
one's children, [4] to marital privacy, [5] to use contraception, [6] to bodily
integrity, and [7] to abortion.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481, 2484 (2003)
(reaffirming the Due Process clause protected liberties of "personal decisions relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education," while adding to that list the right of homosexuals to engage in consensual
sexual activity at home).
112 State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 869-70 (Ohio 2001) (Cook,J., concurring).
113 Id. at 870 (Cook, J., concurring) (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)).
114 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969), overruled on other
grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and
our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citi-

zens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or
restrict this movement.
Id.
115 Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 870 (Cook,J., concurring); see also, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S.
at 630 (finding "no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a
particular constitutional provision" despite upholding that right therein).
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sources of that right. It began by delineating three different "components" embraced by the "right to travel":
[1] the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another
State, [2] the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an
unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and
[3] for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents,
16
the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.'
Having so categorized the right to travel, the Court proceeded to
identify "which specific provision of the United States Constitution
' 17
provides the source for each component of the right to travel."'
The Court identified the source of the second component as the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Section 2 of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution.1 18 The source of the third component, according to the
Court, could be found in the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 19 While the Court declined to identify the
source of the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State, it suggested that "[t]he fight of 'free ingress and regress
to and from' neighboring States... may simply have been 'conceived
from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger
20
Union the Constitution created.'"1
The significance of Roe's "right to travel" source findings is that:
[The U.S. Supreme Court] conspicuously fails to categorize any aspect of the right to travel as being rooted in substantive due process.
When read in conjunction with Glucksberes omission of the right to
travel from its list of fundamental rights, Roe's failure to identify
substantive due process leads to the negative inference that substan12
tive due process is not the constitutional source of the right. '
With substantive due process eliminated as a possible source of the
right to travel, the majority holding of Burnett cannot hold.
Nonetheless, the district court in Johnson found "at least a limited
fundamental right to intrastate travel in the form of a right to freedom of movement." 122 The Sixth Circuit went so far as to "hold that
the Constitution protects a right to travel locally through public
116 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).
117 Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 870 (Cook, J., concurring).
118 Id. (Cook, J., concurring) (citing Roe, 526 U.S. at 501).
119 Id. at 870-71 (Cook, J., concurring) (citing Roe, 526 U.S. at 503-04).
120 Id. at 871 (Cook, J., concurring) (citing Roe, 526 U.S. at 501).
121 Id. (Cook, J., concurring); see alsoJohnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484,
508 (6th Cir. 2002) (Gilman, J., dissenting) ("Noticeably absent from this passage is a
recognition of any right to intrastate travel."), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2276 (2003).
122 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 745 (S.D. Ohio 2000), affd,
310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2276 (2003).
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spaces and roadways."' 23 Both courts drew upon the expressive lan12 4
guage of a litany of Supreme Court cases to imply this freedom.
One such case was Kent v. Dulles, where the Supreme Court, in analyzing the constitutionality of a regulation that denied passports, pro12 5
claimed, "Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values."
Both courts cited Kolender v. Lawson as well, which involved a statute
that rendered loitering a misdemeanor if loiterers refused to identify
themselves and account for their presence when requested to do so by
police. 126 While the Court in Kolender noted that the loitering statute
implicated the right to freedom of movement, it ultimately struck
down the statute as unconstitutionally vague. 127 With these authorities in mind, both Johnson courts concluded that the right to intrastate
travel could be rooted in this right to freedom of movement.1 28
The right to freedom of movement that has developed from Supreme Court cases such as these cannot, however, be extended to envelop the purported right to intrastate travel. As Justice Cook found
in her concurring opinion in Burnett, the Supreme Court "cases suggesting some broad right of 'free movement,"' particularly those cited
by the Johnson courts, "have involved either travel across borders
(whether state or international) [e.g., Kent v. Dulles] or First Amendment vagueness issues [e.g., Kolender v. Lawson]."129 Intrastate travel

alone implicates neither.
Indeed, while the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the
right to interstate travel, 13 0 it has never recognized the extension of
123 Johnson, 310 F.3d at 498.
124 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 744-45; Johnson, 310 F.3d at 495-97.
125 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958); see Johnson, 310 F.3d at 497 (citing
Kent, 357 U.S. at 126);Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 744 (quoting Kent, 357 U.S. at 125).
126 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983); see Johnson, 310 F.3d at 497
(citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358); Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 744-45 (discussing
Kolender).
127 Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 361-62.
128 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 745; Johnson, 310 F.3d at 497-98.
129 State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 872 (Ohio 2001) (Cook, J., concurring).
130 See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262-69 (1974) (holding
that a statute providing residency requirement as a condition to non-emergency hospital care at the government's expense infringed upon the right of interstate travel);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (holding that a law conditioning voting
eligibility on a durational residency requirement constituted an unconstitutional infringement of the right to interstate travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629
(1969) ("This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and
our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free
to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules,
or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement."), overruled on
other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); United States v. Guest, 383

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:1

that freedom to embrace a right to intrastate travel.' 3 ' While there
are several Circuit Court cases recognizing a constitutional right to
intrastate travel, 132 those cases do not reflect a consensus view among
the Circuits, 133 and "were decided before the Supreme Court's clarification of the right to travel in Roe."'

34

In fact, the U.S. Supreme

Court has explicitly declined to decide this issue, 135 and even went so
far as to hold that a purely intrastate restriction on movement does
not violate the right to interstate travel.1 36 Of course, the right to inU.S. 745, 757 (1966) ("The constitutional right to travel from one State to another...
occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right
that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.").
131 See Lutz v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 259 (1990) (noting that right to travel
cases to date have "presented the Supreme Court with no opportunity squarely to
consider the question whether the right to travel includes the right to travel intra
state"); Keith E. Smith, Constitutional Law-Cruisingfor a Bruising-An Attack on the
Right to Interstate Travel, 36 VILL. L. REV. 997, 997 (1991) ("The United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that there is a constitutionally protected fundamental
right to interstate travel, but has never decided whether this right extends to intrastate travel or 'localized intrastate movement.'" (citations omitted)).
132 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 745 (citing Spencer v. Casavilla, 903 F.2d 171 (2d
Cir. 1990); Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975)).
133 See, e.g., Wardwell v. Cincinnati Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 529 F.2d 625, 627-28
(6th Cir. 1976) (rejecting a fundamental right to intrastate travel); Wright v. Jackson,
506 F.2d 900, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting a fundamental right to intrastate
travel); Townes v. St. Louis, 949 F. Supp. 731, 734-35 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (noticing the
circuit split over the existence of the fundamental right to intrastate travel and expressing doubt as to whether the Eighth Circuit would recognize it), affd, 112 F.3d 514
(8th Cir. 1997).
134 Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 872 (Cook, J., concurring) (referencing Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999)).
135 Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974) ("[Whether] to
draw a constitutional distinction between interstate and intrastate travel [is] a question we do not now consider .. "); Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 872 (Cook, J., concurring)
(rejecting the majority's attempt to bootstrap the right to intrastate travel onto the
"firmly embedded" fundamental right to interstate travel by noting that, when given
the opportunity, "the Supreme Court has specifically declined to consider whether the
right to interstate travel includes the right to intrastate travel") (citing Mem'l Hosp.,
415 U.S. at 255-56). Nor can the Supreme Court's plurality opinion striking down
Chicago's gang loitering ordinance in Chicago v. Morales extend the right to freedom
of movement to include a right to intrastate travel. Though Justice Stevens propounded that "the freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of the 'liberty'
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [and] this
right to remove from one place to another according to inclination [is] an attribute
of personal liberty protected by the Constitution," only Justices Souter and Ginsburg
joined him on this finding. 527 U.S. 41, 53 (1999) (Stevens,J., concurring).
136 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 277 (1993) (holding
that anti-abortion demonstrations near abortion clinics that "restrict[ ] movement
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terstate travel "protects interstate travelers against two sets of burdens:
'the erection of actual barriers to interstate movement' and 'being
treated differently' from intrastate travelers." 13 7 Accordingly, the
right to interstate travel forbids the implementation of exclusionary
zoning in a manner that would render it impossible for an excluded
individual to leave a state without. passing through a drug exclusion
zone. Such implementation would effectively create an impermissible
barrier to interstate travel by criminalizing it. Short of "imprisoning"
excluded individuals within their own state, however, drug exclusion
zones do not trammel upon any recognized travel rights.
Ultimately, as the Ohio Court of Appeals rightly found in its illfated Burnett decision, "intrastate travel ....

unlike interstatetravel, has

never been officially recognized by the United States Supreme Court
as a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right."13 8 The legitimacy of the purported right is dubious at best.
b.

Exclusion Zones and Strict Scrutiny

Nonetheless, peaceful coexistence is possible between drug exclusion zones and the right to intrastate travel. Assuming that there is
indeed a fundamental right to intrastate travel, the drug exclusion
zone ordinances could still survive the incumbent heightened scrutiny
that the implication of such a fundamental right would entail. While
the level of scrutiny triggered by infringements upon the right to intrastate travel is uncertain, 139 examination of exclusionary zoning's
ability to surpass the highest level of scrutiny-strict scrutiny-demonstrates that the measure can exist beyond right to intrastate travel
reproach.
For an ordinance infringing upon the right to travel to survive a
strict scrutiny, it must be "[1] narrowly tailored [2] to serve a compelling state interest. 1 40 Both the Johnson and Burnett courts agree that
the Cincinnati City Council's drug exclusion zones serve a compelling
from one portion of the Commonwealth of Virginia to another" constitute "a purely
intrastate restriction [that] does not implicate the right to interstate travel").
137 Id. at 277 (quoting Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n.6 (1982)).
138 State v. Burnett, No. C-981003, 2000 WL 955614, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 23,
1999), rev'd, 755 N.E. 2d 857 (Ohio 2001).
139 Justice Cook argued that the compelling interest test is not automatically triggered by infringements on the right to travel, noting that "the Supreme Court has
applied strict scrutiny only to certain impediments to interstate travel." Burnett, 755
N.E.2d at 873 (Cook, J., concurring) (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)).
140 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
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state interest. The federal district court stated that "improving the
quality of life in neighborhoods by preventing repeat drug offenders
from violating drug abuse laws time and time again is a compelling
interest.' 141 The Ohio Supreme Court likewise found the governmental interest compelling, noting: "The destruction of some neighborhoods by illegal drug activity has created a crisis of national
magnitude, and governments are justified in attacking the problem
1 42
aggressively.
While both the Johnson and Burnett courts found the interest
prompting the Cincinnati City Council's exclusion ordinance to be
compelling, neither found it to be narrowly tailored. The federal district court reached this conclusion because drug exclusion zones exclude "persons [who] may have innumerable lawful reasons to enter
[the drug exclusion zone]." 1 4 The Ohio Supreme Court employed
slightly more evocative words in reaching the same conclusion:
A person subject to the exclusion ordinance may not enter a drug
exclusion zone to speak with counsel, to visit family, to attend
church, to receive emergency medical care, to go to a grocery store,
14 4
or just to stand on a street corner and look at a blue sky.
Because the ordinances proscribe activities that are both innocuous
and law-abiding, these courts held that the ordinances were not narrowly tailored to meet the acknowledged compelling governmental
interest.
As was seen in the discussion on associational challenges, the importance of variances that contemplate legitimate purposes for excluded individuals to enter the exclusion zones cannot be
understated. Such variances serve to narrowly tailor these drug exclusion zones to a compelling state interest, insulating this strain of trespass-zoning from substantive due process challenges. For this reason,
as discussed below in considering the bounds of the exclusion zones,
variances should be readily available for issue by police, and even, in
141 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 746 (S.D. Ohio 2000); see
alsoJohnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 502 (6th Cir. 2002) ("We agree with
the district court's conclusion that the City's interest in enacting the Ordinance-to
enhance the quality of life in drug-plagued neighborhoods and to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of citizens in those areas-represents a compelling government
interest."), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
142 Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 866.
143 Johnson, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 747; see also Johnson, 310 F.3d at 503 ("[T]he Ordinance... presents constitutional tailoring problems because it broadly excludes individuals from [the drug exclusion zone] without regard to their reason for travel in the
neighborhood.").
144 Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 867.
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many cases, issued simultaneously with the exclusion. Allowing for
zone access in cases of meeting with counsel, accessing social services,
or receiving emergency medical care should be, and in Portland is,
provided for. 14 5 Of course, for the zones to maintain their effectiveness, and for the rule not to be swallowed by its exceptions, there must
be a limit as to the variances' breadth. On the spectrum of legitimate
purposes meriting variances, visits with relatives beyond immediate
family and church attendance should be considered borderline, and
patronage of grocery stores and staring at blue skies should be
deemed illegitimate outright. Whereas the Constitution will provide a
baseline of legitimate purposes for which variances should be issued,
the balance of exceptions should be left to the discretion of the city
councils who must answer directly to the affected constituents on Election Day.
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit found that "the Ordinance's variance mechanism [could] not save the Ordinance from constitutional
infirmity because it only protects the constitutional right to localized
travel for a limited group of affected individuals." 14 6 This holding
fails to account for the fact that the alleged constitutional rights of the
excluded remainder have been legitimately abrogated in keeping with
the important principles upon which trespass law rests. While a trespasser may not consciously trespass "with illegal intention,"1 47 it is the
trespasser's very presence that is illegal. The conduct of otherwise
constitutionally protected activities can nonetheless become illegal in
certain areas when the legislature, in an expression assigning a societal value to a prescribed piece of land, rightly implements trespass
laws to protect that greater societal land use. Trespass laws may be
designed for any number of social reasons, be it capitalistic protection
of private property, 1 48 or national security protection of a military
base. 149 With drug exclusion zones, trespass law is employed to pro145

PORTLAND, OR., CODE

ch. 14B.20.060(B) (2003).

146 Johnson, 310 F.3d at 505.
147 Burnett, 755 N.E.2d at 867.
148 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 13, at 67 (5th ed. 1984).
In the bundle of rights, privileges, powers, and immunities that are enjoyed
by an owner of real property, perhaps the most important is the right to the
exclusive "use" of the realty. An interference with this exclusive possessory
interest brought about in a direct way from an act committed by the defendant was regarded legally as actionable.
Id. That cause of action sounded in "trespass to land." Id.
149 United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 677 (1985) (upholding statute designed to maintain security on military bases through the enforcement of trespass

law).
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tect neighborhoods and the people who live within them from destruction by illegal drug activity. Variances narrowly tailor the zones
to that end.
Of course, it is not enough that constitutionally protected behavior may properly be restrained in areas of restricted access. The legitimacy of the imposition of trespass law on a particular public area, and
by extension, the categorization of a particular person as a trespasser,
must also be established. This application of trespass law on targeted
areas calls to mind Euclidean zoning, which had also been "assailed
on the grounds that it [was] in derogation . . . of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the Federal Constitution in that it deprived appellee
of liberty and property without due process of law."' 50 There, the City
Council of Euclid, Ohio, assigned by ordinance acceptable physical
uses to particular areas within its jurisdiction.' 5 1 According to the
U.S. Supreme Court, this assignment by the City Council found 'justification in some aspect of the police power" in that it has "substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 15 2
Exclusionary zoning may also find justification in the police power, in
that the aggressive attack on likely repeat offenders waged by drug
exclusion zones bolsters the "public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare" of distressed neighborhoods otherwise endangered by the
heel of drug crime. 153 Just as Euclid's zoning distinguished by area
physical uses that were welcome from those that were not based on a
use's potential for detrimental effect on an area's public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare, Cincinnati and Portland have, in exercising their police power, legitimately distinguished by area those persons who are welcome from those who are not based on an
individual's deleterious predisposition to drug crime. As posited by
the "Broken Windows" theory of crime, that deleterious predisposition has not only an adverse effect on the neighborhood's social welfare, but also, like those uses targeted by Euclidean zoning, its physical
welfare. Thus, courts could interpret the imposition of trespass law
upon endangered neighborhoods as justified by a legitimate city
council exercise of the police power, leaving a trespasser's otherwise
constitutionally protected behavior properly restrained in those areas.
Furthermore, courts could instead look at the drug exclusion
zones in a manner akin to legitimate First Amendment time, place,
and manner restrictions. For example, in City of Renton v. Playtime
150
151
152
153

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926).
Id. at 379-83.
Id. at 387, 395.
Id. at 395.
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Theatres, the Supreme Court considered the city of Renton's zoning
ordinance prohibiting adult theatres from locating within 1000 feet of
schools, homes, churches, or parks.1 54 The Court rejected the adult
theater owner's claim that the ordinance was in derogation of his First
Amendment rights because the ordinance was an acceptable "time,
place, and manner regulation" that was "aimed not at the content of
the films shown at 'adult motion picture theatres,' but rather at the
155
secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding community."
Essentially, though the Renton ordinance by definition targeted adult
film theaters, it was unrelated to the suppression of free speech, standing instead as a content-neutral prohibition "designed to combat the
undesirable secondary effects of such businesses."' 156 While in Renton,
the right at issue was that of free speech, the reasoning behind First
Amendment content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations
could similarly be invoked to address the drug exclusion zone ordinances' purported infringement upon the right to intrastate travel.
Though drug exclusion zone ordinances by definition target for exclusion individuals with a criminal record including drug related offenses, these ordinances are unrelated to the suppression of the right
to intrastate travel. Rather, they are a neutral prohibition "designed
to combat the undesirable secondary effects" of the excluded individual's presence. Aimed at secondary effects rather than the excluded
individuals themselves, the zones' neutral prohibitions cannot be
painted as impermissibly criminalizing status. By considering exclusionary zoning as a regulation of time, place, and manner, courts may
find the drug exclusion zones to be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.
Whether it be through broad variances embracing constitutionally protected activities, the legitimate restraint of such activities by
proper exercise of the police power, or framing as time, place, and
manner regulations, the drug exclusion ordinances are narrowly tailored to exclude, or to remove, those elements of a neighborhood
that contribute in their mere presence to the derogation of social order. In so doing, these ordinances brace vulnerable neighborhoods
against the vicious downward spiral otherwise enabled by allowing social and physical disorder to feed off of each other.

154
155
156

475 U.S. 41, 44-45 (1986).
Id. at 46-47, 49.
Id. at 49.
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Rooting Exclusionary Zoning in the Principles of Bail, Parole, and
Probation: Bypassing the Purported Right to Intrastate Travel and
Other Constitutional Concerns

While Supreme Court jurisprudence has not yet made clear
whether the right to intrastate travel is a fundamental right under the
U.S. Constitution, perhaps, in deference to the unique role that free
movement played in the founding of this country, it should be.
Whether the right exists or not, whether it is fundamental or not, this
examination has demonstrated that drug exclusion zones could nonetheless survive even the most heightened constitutional scrutiny. It is
now submitted that even if these exclusionary zones cannot survive
strict scrutiny, even if they are not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, municipalities may still legitimately employ them in their fight against drug crime. Ultimately, the exclusion
of those arrested for, or convicted of, drug-related offenses does not
implicate the aforementioned constitutional protections. As a result
of their arrest or conviction, the excluded individuals are transformed
from standard citizen status into that of an arrestee or detainee. As
such, these seized individuals have forfeited those protections discussed above, leaving the adjudication of the legitimacy of their restriction from designated zones to Fourth Amendment
"reasonableness" analysis. Essentially, the limitations imposed by the
exclusion ordinances are intended only for those properly seized in
keeping with the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, this examination is
informed by a consideration of those restraints placed on seized individuals that have historically passed Fourth Amendment musternamely, the principles behind bail, parole, and probation.
It must be noted from the outset that bringing the discussion of
drug exclusion zones within the province of Fourth Amendment analysis may not necessarily preclude consideration of other purported
constitutional infringements. Nonetheless, while the U.S. Supreme
Court in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property "rejected the
view that the applicability of one constitutional amendment pre-empts
the guarantees of another,"15 7 the Court's treatment of alleged Fourth
Amendment violations suggests an exception. The U.S. Supreme
Court has repeatedly found that claims asserting a violation of a
157 United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1993)
("Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more
than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim's 'dominant' character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn." (quoting
Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992)).
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Fourth Amendment protection should be analyzed under "that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'substantive due
process.' "15 Regardless of whether an alleged Fourth Amendment ab-

rogation merits concurrent examination of other protections rooted
in "more generalized" constitutional rights, the developed legal principles of bail, parole, and probation have repeatedly recognized that a
properly seized individual retains only limited, if any, access to those
rights.
By rooting the legitimacy of the drug exclusion zones in terms of
Fourth Amendment seizure, important restraints limiting to whom
the zones may be applied must be recognized. Such restraints will be
discussed below in examining the theoretical boundaries of exclusionary zoning. But first the examination will consider how, in their relation to concepts of bail, parole, and probation, the exclusion zones
meet Fourth Amendment "reasonability."
a.

The Constitutionality of Seizure with Respect to Bail, Parole,
Probation, and Drug Exclusion Zones

Even if exclusion zones fail to survive the strict scrutiny analysis
incumbent upon a governmental attempt to abrogate a fundamental
right, their legitimacy nonetheless survives because the zones fail to
implicate the right to intrastate travel or freedom of association whatsoever-thus failing to trigger strict scrutiny analysis. Exclusion zones
circumvent these asserted rights in the same manner as the body of
law on which bail, parole, and probation firmly stand. The principles
behind bail, parole, probation, and, it is submitted, exclusion zones,
rest upon the notion that the individual, in committing a crime, forfeits many of his or her rights, including freedom of association and
the purported right to intrastate travel. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court's rejection of a First Amendment challenge to the Richmond
public housing authority's street-based trespass policy in Virginia v.
Hicks validates the connection drawn between exclusionary zoning
and the loss of rights due to prior bad acts. 159 In fact, those principles
158 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see also County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-43 (1998) (citing Graham with approval); Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (citing Graham with approval).
159 Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191, 2199 (2003).
Punishing... violation [of a trespass policy] by a person who wishes to engage in free speech no more implicates the First Amendment than would
the punishment of a person who has (pursuant to lawful regulation) been
banned from a public park after vandalizing it, and who ignores the ban in
order to take part in a political demonstration.

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

(VOL. 79:1

of bail, parole, and probation stand in stark contrast to the unfettered
freedom of movement that Americans are widely professed to enjoy.
In defending its drug exclusion ordinance, Cincinnati argued
"that exclusion is a form of seizure and its constitutionality must be
determined under the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment," which proscribes only those governmental seizures of persons
which are "unreasonable."' 60 The district court in Johnson rejected
this argument, refusing to "believe that an arrestee released upon
bond or a convicted person released from prison or on probation with
restrictions on their [sic] liberty is being seized in the same way a person in detention is seized."' 6' However, though municipalities "cannot continue to argue that [an excluded] person has no more rights
than a seized person,"1 62 that is not to say that a person excluded pursuant to his or her arrest has as many rights as does a person who was
never seized at all. As the City of Cincinnati argued before the district
court in Johnson, "arrestees do not have the same right to freedom of
63
movement as non-arrestees may have."'
While the freedom of movement of an arrestee out on bail, probation, or parole is not as severely restricted as that of a detainee, it is
still to a significant extent legitimately restrained. It is upon this premise that the drug exclusion zones most effectively stand. It is well
accepted that "[t]he post-arrest phase consists of. . . restrictions on
day-to-day freedom of movement depending on the conditions of pretrial release. 1 64 The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides just one example of the extent to which significant restraints on movement may be
placed on criminal defendants released pending trial.' 65 Should the
160 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 739 (S.D. Ohio 2000), affd,
310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
161 Id. at 740.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 744.
164 Surell Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L.
REv. 1, 61 (2000) (citingJOHN L. WEINBERG, FEDERAL BAIL AND DETENTION HANDBOOK
6-6 (1999)).
165 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1) (B) (iv) (2000) (permitting judicial officers to order the pretrial release of persons charged with committing offenses. against the United States subject to the condition that such persons "abide by
specified restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or travel").
The Sixth Circuit rejected the analogous relationship shared between exclusion
zones and the Bail Reform Act's pretrial conditional release provision. In doing so,
the court invoked United States v. Salerno, which, in affirming the constitutionality of
the Bail Reform Act's pretrial detention provision, held: "When the Government
proves by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and
articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe that, consistent with
the Due Process Clause, a court may disable that arrestee from executing that threat."
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arrestee be convicted of the underlying drug crime and imprisoned,
the legitimacy of that newly designated detainee's exclusion is made
patent by penal confinement. As for the post-conviction period,
Fourth Amendment analysis does not apply. 166 Nonetheless, courts
have found that parolees: (1) enjoy "only... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions"; 16 7 (2) do
not have a constitutional right to travel;' 68 and (3) whatever right to

481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987). From this holding, the circuit court in Johnson discerned a
safeguard in the Bail Reform Act that it assumed to be lacking in the exclusion zones.
According to the Sixth Circuit, while the Bail Reform Act accounts for the arrestee's
likelihood of recidivism, the exclusion zones do "not require any particularized finding that the arrested or convicted individual is likely to repeat his or her drug crime."
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 503 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
2276 (2003). Thus, the court found that "failure to include procedural safeguards
resembling the protections incorporated into the Bail Reform Act, weighs heavily
against finding the Ordinance constitutional." Id. at 504.
The Sixth Circuit's reliance on Salerno to impose upon the zones a prerequisite
"likelihood of recidivism" determination is misplaced, however. The Salerno Court's
call for such a determination was based on the Bail Reform Act's pretrial detention
provision on which it was passing, not.the pretrial conditionalrelease provision to which
the drug exclusion zones more aptly relate. Furthermore, even if such a determination is required to issue exclusions, there is "general evidence that individuals arrested and/or convicted for drug activity in [the drug free zones] typically return to
the neighborhood and repeat their offenses." Id. at 503. The Sixth Circuit, determined to conjure a right to intrastate travel, failed to give this evidence due credit.
Id. at 503-04.
166 Johnson, 310 F.3d at 491 ("[T]here is simply no reasonable basis for the City's
assertion that the Fourth Amendment provides the exclusive analytical framework to
evaluate the post-conviction provision of the Ordinance.").
167 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); see alsoJames G. Gentry, Review
of Selected 2000 CaliforniaLegislation: Crimes, The Interstate Compact for Adult Offender Supervision:Parolee and ProbationerSupervision Enters the Twenty-First Century, 32 McGEORGE
L. Rxv. 533, 536 n.28 (2001).
168 See, e.g., Bagley v. Harvey, 718 F.2d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[A]n individual's
constitutional right to travel, having been legally extinguished by a valid conviction
followed by imprisonment, is not revived by the change in status from prisoner to
parolee.") (citing Greenholtz v. Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), holding that a
person constitutionally convicted cannot invoke due process guarantees for the denial
of liberty not presently possessed); Rizzo v. Terenzi, 619 F. Supp. 1186, 1189 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) ("While the right to travel from state to state is indeed constitutionally protected, an individual's right to travel, extinguished by conviction and subsequent imprisonment, is not revived upon parole." (citations omitted)); Landman v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621, 643 (E.D. Va. 1971) ("Criminal activity, it is thought, once proved by
legal procedures, fairly works a forfeiture of any rights the curtailment of which may
be necessary in pursuit of these ends, such as the right of privacy, association, travel,
and choice of occupation."); Gentry, supra note 167, at 536 n.28.
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travel they might hold is no greater than a prisoner's. 1 69 Indeed,
states can place severe restrictions on parolees, including limits on
170
their rights to association and travel.
The Supreme Court has also passed on the validity of right to
travel restrictions imposed upon a person convicted of a crime. The
Court in Jones v. Helms, upon considering the constitutionality of a
Georgia statute that transformed willful abandonment of a child from
a misdemeanor to a felony when the accused parent leaves the state,
held:
Despite the fundamental nature of [the] right [to interstate travel],
there nonetheless are situations in which a State may prevent a citizen from leaving. Most obvious is the case in which a person has
been convicted of a crime within a State ....

Indeed, even before

trial or conviction, probable cause may justify an arrest and subse171
quent temporary detention.
The lower Johnson court failed to recognize the significance of the
Supreme Court's language in Helms. The federal district court interpreted the Helms decision as applying strict scrutiny to the Georgia
statute, assuming that the statute merely survived as narrowly tailored
to meet a compelling state interest. 172 Contrary to the lower Johnson
court's assumption, the Supreme Court in Helms does not focus on
the implications of the statute, but rather the status of the right itself.
The Court does not find that the statute survives despite implicating
the right (as would be the case when a measure survives strict scrutiny), but rather that the right is so qualified by past criminal conduct
as to not be implicated by the statute at all. 173 Helms makes clear that
169 See, e.g., Paulus v. Fenton, 443 F. Supp. 473, 476 (M.D. Pa. 1977) ("Parole is, in
many respects, a continuation of confinement.... As a matter of constitutional requirements, [a parolee] would appear to have no more choice over his parole residence than he had in serving his federal time in [prison] .... ); Gentry, supra note
167, at 536 n.28.
170 NEIL P. COHEN & JAMES J. GOBERT, THE LAW Or PROBATION AND PAROLE
§§ 6.09-6.18, at 244-57 (1983) (discussing limits on parolees' rights to association);
id. §§ 6.19-6.24, at 257-66 (discussing restrictions on parolees' freedom of
movement).
171 Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 419 (1981).
172 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 746 (S.D. Ohio 2000) ("The
implication this Court draws from Helms is that the Supreme Court recognized that in
some instances the state may have a compelling interest in preventing criminals from
leaving their jurisdiction and that the Georgia statute at issue was narrowly tailored to
achieve this goal."), aff'd, 310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276

(2003).
173 Helms, 452 U.S. at 421 ("[A]ppellee's criminal conduct within the State of
Georgia necessarily qualified his right thereafter freely to travel interstate.").
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an individual's criminal conduct can circumscribe that individual's
right to travel.
The Sixth Circuit in Johnson also rejected Cincinnati's attempt to
bring the drug exclusion zones under Fourth Amendment analysis.
Disproportionately relying on Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Albright v. Oliver, the appellate court found that the only purpose of arrest was "to compel an appearance in court."1 74 Finding that the drug
exclusion zones were not designed to compel a court appearance, the
Sixth Circuit disqualified the zones from the Fourth Amendment's an1 75
alytical framework for evaluating a restriction's constitutionality.
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence limiting seizure to only those measures designed to compel attendance at trial, however, breaks with a
more expansive understanding of the term expressed by binding Supreme Court precedent. To be seized, a person need only be restrained from his or her freedom of movement "by means of physical
force or a show of authority.1 76 As drug exclusion zones do constitute
a further form of seizure, they are properly subject to Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" review-a standard to which they readily rise.
Drug exclusion zones are simply an extension of bail, parole, and
probation principles. Nonetheless, to root these innovative and aggressive tools in such well-established concepts, boundaries to their
application must be recognized. If drug exclusion zones are to find
their legitimacy in bail, parole, and probation principles, only a seized
individual can be an excluded individual. Put differently, only those
individuals walking the streets on bail, on parole, or on probation may
be subject to exclusion from otherwise public spaces. Furthermore,
the extent to which an excluded individual's liberty may be restricted
must not exceed that which is permissible for other properly seized
arrestees or detainees. If it is to rely upon the principles of bail, parole, and probation, the implementation of exclusion zones in most
respects must fit within the mold cast by those principles. Where the
zones cannot fit, those differences must be noticed andjustified. With
this in mind, the outer boundaries of the exclusion zones may now be
considered.

174 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 492 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting A]bright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 278 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
175 Id. at 493.
176 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980) (emphasis added).
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Testing the Limits of Exclusion Zoning

The assertion that the legitimacy of drug exclusion zones are
rooted in the principles of bail, parole, and probation demands that
such zones not exceed the parameters set by those same concepts.
Accordingly, it must be determined how well drug exclusion zones fit
within the construct set by these seizure principles that fall just short
raised
of detainment. This may be done by revisiting the questions
177
drafted.
currently
as
zones
the
of
above to inform the reach
Who may be excluded? The policy decision on which individuals
should be subject to exclusion, insofar as identifying offenses justifying exclusion, lies best within the discretion of the local city councils
who are elected by those people most affected by the zoning, most
harmed by the crime, and most assuaged by this application of trespass-zoning. Upon identifying the offenses meriting exclusion, local
governments must enumerate those offenses.
As the above discussion identifying the proper source of exclusionary zoning suggests, the exclusions must revolve around either a
conviction or pending prosecution so as to not implicate the right to
freedom of movement in whatever form. This ideological tethering
mandates temporal boundaries on the exclusion, beyond those explicitly provided by the ordinances (ninety days for arrest, one year for
conviction). In keeping with principles of bail, parole, and probation,
there are three phases that must be considered in delimiting which
individuals may legitimately be excluded and subject to arrest for
criminal trespass in defined public areas. The first is the post-arrest/
pre-trial phase. This phase begins upon the arrest of the individual,
and lasts up until the underlying charges are dropped by the prosecutor, dismissed by a judge, or reach verdict by a trier of fact. During
this phase, exclusion is entirely acceptable insofar as it recalls the parameters of bail principles.
For reasons discussed below related to who may legitimately issue
exclusion notices, the exclusion cannot begin until after a judicial determination of probable cause. It necessarily follows that these civil
exclusions should not "allow[ ] police to exclude people based on evidence that they know is insufficient to get a conviction" for the underlying crime, 178 and certainly should not be applied to individuals who
have secured an acquittal.
The Cincinnati ordinance predicates the ninety-day pre-conviction exclusion of individuals "arrested or otherwise taken into custody
within any drug exclusion zone" for enumerated activities upon the
177
178

See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
Green, supra note 66.
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condition that such "exclusion cease immediately if the person arrested or otherwise taken into custody for [the enumerated crimes] is
subsequently acquitted of the charge(s), said charge(s) is/are dismissed, or the charge(s) is/are no longer being pursued by law enforcement."1 79 Ironically, the Portland Code, which, unlike its
Cincinnati counterpart, survives today, has no such immediate cessation provision. For this reason, the Portland provision could conceivably be applied to an individual who had secured an acquittal, or
against whom the charges have been dismissed or dropped. Application of ordinances restricting movement of such individuals cannot be
based on bail, parole, and probation principles, and thus would be
illegitimate restrictions under Fourth Amendment reasonableness
analysis. But should the excluded individual enter a guilty plea, or
upon reaching trial be convicted for the underlying charges, the exclusion will enter the second phase with a duration of one year as
prescribed by the ordinances. As the discussion regarding the next
two stages will make clear, however, that one-year, post-conviction exclusion is subject to further limitations based upon bail, parole, and
probation principles.
The second phase to be considered in defining the limits of exclusionary zoning is the post-conviction period after release and
before the conclusion of probation or parole. This is the simplest of
the three phases, as it will likely involve a one-year exclusion taking
effect upon the date of the individual's conviction for the underlying
crime.' 8 0 During this phase, the excluded individual will either be in
jail serving the sentence for the secured conviction, or out on the
streets subject to probation or parole. The individual's exclusion
throughout this phase is legitimate insofar as it recalls those principles
that validate restrictions on the movement of parolees and individuals
on probation.
The third, and most problematic, phase is the period that follows
the individual's release, probation, and parole. During this period,
the convicted individual cannot be excluded, regardless of the fact that
this phase may begin within the ordinances' one-year exclusion period. Quite simply, these individuals have served their time and may
at that point be considered "out of the system." It is at this point that
their fundamental rights, such as travel and association, 18 1 are no
179 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-5 (1999). But see PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch.
14B.20 (2003) (failing to provide for exclusion to cease upon acquittal, or dismissed
or dropped charges).
180 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-5; PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.30(B).
181 See discussion supra Part III.A.2, 3.
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longer qualified, and the formerly excluded individual may be considered fully reinstated with rights. Despite the fact that they remain a
threat as "potential recidivists," their exclusion upon reaching this
phase must end. Of course, this phase is merely conceptual, and perhaps in practice, or in keeping with the spirit of the exclusion ordinances, probationary periods and paroles are or could be set to cover
the duration of the intended year of exclusion. In such an event, this
third phase could conceivably be defined out of existence. In any
event, and in keeping with the principles of bail, parole, and probation upon which this examination founds the legitimacy of the exclusion zones, the exclusion of those targeted offenders must end upon
the conclusion of their penance for the commission of the underlying
18 2
crime. s
Who may issue the exclusion? When analyzed as a form of reasona-

ble seizure consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the most controversial aspect of the exclusion zones becomes determining who is to
be entrusted with the authority to impose the restraint. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Gerstein v. Pugh that "the Fourth Amendment
requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite
to extended restraint of liberty following arrest."1 8 3 The U.S. District
Court in Johnson v. City of Cincinnati took note of Gerstein when re-

jecting Cincinnati's argument that the constitutionality of its drug exclusion zones should be determined under the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard for governmental seizures of persons, concluding that "the City Council usurped judicial authority when it attempted to regulate the status of a class of arrestees and convicted
persons." 18 4 The primary concern of Gerstein, however, was not the
identity of the entity "regulat[ing] the status of a class of arrestees and
convicted persons," but simply the identity of the entity issuing the
probable cause determination. The Court's holding requires that "ex-

tended restraint of liberty following arrest" be preceded by a magistrate's neutral determination of probable cause, but it does not
182 Interestingly, this is an area where acceptance of the ordinances' implication
of the right to travel, as well as other fundamental rights, would come to the exclusion
zones' aid because triggering the compelling interests test returns the discussion to an
analysis of the validity of an infringement upon a fundamental right, as opposed to
the reliance of bail/parole/probation principles upon the qualification of the right
itself. Rooted in analysis directed at the infringement rather than the right, the
zones' ability to survive strict scrutiny as narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interest would justify that infringement and allow a court to sustain the exclusion
beyond the conclusion of a probationary period.
183 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (emphasis added).
184 Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 740 (S.D. Ohio 2000), aff'd,
310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003).
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preclude a City Council's ability to restrain the movement of an individual once probable cause has been so determined. Though Gerstein
requires a magistrate's neutral judgment on probable cause prior to
imposing "extended restraint[s] of liberty following arrest," the decision does not mandate that it be a magistrate who imposes those restraints. Contrary to the Fourth Amendment holding in Johnson, a
City Council that assumes a pro-active role in restraining the movement of an individual whom police had probable cause to apprehend
for an enumerated drug crime does not run afoul of Gerstein. City
councils, so closely accountable to their electorate, 18 5 are precisely the
authority to be entrusted to "regulate the status of a class of arrestees
and convicted persons."
Therefore, a slight tailoring of the exclusion process would effectively bring the drug exclusion zones in accord with Gerstein without
sacrificing any of the ordinance's potency. Simply delaying the commencement of the exclusion until after the state prevails in a probable
cause hearing before a neutral magistrate would satisfy Gerstein, while
maintaining the integrity of the ordinance's fight against crime. The
apprehended suspect remains in police custody in the interval between arrest and the probable cause hearing, posing no threat of returning to the endangered community protected by the drug
exclusion zone ordinance. If probable cause is found to be lacking,
the suspect is released and the exclusion never commences, in keeping with the provision that "exclusion cease immediately if the person
arrested or otherwise taken into custody for [the enumerated crimes]
is subsequently acquitted of the charge(s), said charge(s) is/are dismissed, or the charge(s) is/are no longer being pursued by law
18 6
enforcement."
The prerequisite judicial determination of probable cause would,
however, require the abandonment of one particular use of exclusion
notices. As the Portland ordinance now stands, and as the Cincinnati
ordinance formerly provided, police could issue an exclusion notice
to an individual while foregoing pursuit of the underlying drug-re185 See, e.g.,
George Bush, Federalism:Restoring the Balance, 18 CUMB. L. REv. 125,
128 (1987) (arguing that some social programs may be more effectively run by local
governments because they have closer ties to the people and are thus more accountable to the electorate); Scott Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels: The New JudicialActivism in
Theory andPractice,83 MARQ. L. REv. 435, 451 (1999) ("One person has a greater voice
when the government unit is smaller, and local governments are more accountable to
their citizens."); see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45, 46 (James Madison) (exhibiting the
Founding Fathers' concern for centralized government and preference for the
greater accountability of state and local governments).

186

CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE

ch. 755-5 (1999).
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lated charges. 18 7 In such instances of "exclusion alone," the excluded
individual may, as always, appeal the exclusion to a neutral magistrate,188 which would be overturned if the city could not show "that
the exclusion is based upon probable cause to believe that the appellant
committed any of the offenses enumerated" by the Code.' 89 It may be
argued that the individual excluded without being charged for the
triggering offense is nonetheless afforded the opportunity to avail
himself of a probable cause hearing by way of the exclusion notice
appeal, and, by waiving that opportunity, has in a sense pled guilty to
the behavior that prompted his exclusion. As compelling as this reasoning may be, however, the exclusion inescapably remains an "extended restraint of liberty following arrest," and thus runs counter to
Gerstein's requirement that a judicial determination of probable cause
precede such a restraint.
This limitation may be severe, but not fatal, to the effectiveness of
the drug exclusion zones. The probable cause requirement allowing
exclusions alone to survive appeal is the very same requirement of
probable cause in arresting an individual for the underlying enumerated offenses. 190 Therefore, though it is the exclusion alone that is
appealed, it is in fact the underlying crime giving rise to the exclusion
that must survive a,probable cause challenge, and thus, in theory,
there should be no reason to pursue the exclusion of an individual
without also pursuing conviction for the underlying offense. In the
real world, however, there may be many reasons that police would
choose to pursue exclusion alone rather than in conjunction with the
underlying enumerated offense. Simple "on-the-spot" exclusion
187 CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-9; PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.050
(2003).
188 See CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE ch. 755-11 ("The person to whom an exclusion
notice is issued shall have a right to an appeal from the issuance of the notice."); id.
ch. 755-11(a)(1) ("A hearing on the appeal shall be had to the safety director or the
safety director's designee."); id. ch. 755-13(h) ("The decision [of the safety director
or the safety director's designee] is final subject to appeal to a court of competent
jurisdiction or reconsideration."); PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.060(A) ("A person to whom notice of exclusion is issued shall have a right to appeal ....");id. ch.
14B.20.060(A) (1) ("Appeals shall be made to the Code Hearings Officer of the City of
Portland."); id. ch. 22.10.060 ("[A]ppeals from any determination by the Code Hearings Officer shall be by writ of review to the Circuit Court of Multnomah County,
Oregon . .

").

ch. 14B.20.060(A) (8) (emphasis added); see also CINCIN755-11(a)(3) (requiring that the exclusion be "based on conduct which constitutes any of the crimes enumerated" by the ordinance).
190 PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 14B.20.060(A) (8); see also CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE
ch. 755-11 (a) (3).
189

PORTLAND, OR., CODE

NATI, OHIO, CODE ch.
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would probably prove less taxing to a municipality's resources than
dogged judicial pursuit of a conviction for every violation of a minor
enumerated offense, such as possession of a small quantity of narcotics. Cynics may argue that the exclusion alone would present the police with the opportunity to abuse the ordinance by issuing the
exclusion notices in borderline cases that skirt the edge of probable
cause, hedging their bets that the excluded individual will not take the
effort and cost to challenge the exclusion. Regardless of the practical
reasons for foregoing the prosecution of underlying offenses when issuing exclusion notices, the proper operation of these aggressive
zones requires that the police, to whom the zones are most directly
entrusted, be held to the highest of standards, so as to avoid any appearance of impropriety or abuse, and thereby engage the safeguards
of the judiciary at least in the minimal capacity required by Gerstein.
Why should police, rather than judges, issue the exclusions? Though
the legality of vesting city councils, and the police acting through
them, with the power to exclude certain criminal offenders has been
established, the wisdom of such a power allocation remains to be considered. This proposed vesting does not call for a tectonic shift in the
powers to issue terms of bail, parole, and probation. Rather, it is submitted that an extremely narrow and limited area based upon those
principles be reserved to local city councils and their police for the
implementation of these drug exclusion zones, and for very good reason. First, in light of the aggressive and controversial nature of exclusion, the implementation of exclusion zones should remain subject to
the highest level of accountability. The police, to whom the powers
and enforcement of the exclusion zones are most directly entrusted,
derive their powers and authority from the municipal ordinances enacted by the city councils. The city councils are most subject to the
will of the local people affected by the zones, both positively and negatively, by way of elections. The subjugation of such political entities to
the check and balance of the affected electorate serves as a safeguard,
allowing for the success or failure of the zones and their implementation to be reflected at the ballot box.
Furthermore, the accountability inherent in the electoral process
is a check unknown to mostjudges. Indeed, the creation of laws mandating judicial sentences including identical exclusion provisions for
the same time period from the same zones could arguably serve the
same end as the civil exclusions designed by Portland and Cincinnati.
Exclusions courtesy ofjudges would likely even meet less judicial resis-
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tance. 191 Mandatory sentencing provisions, however, are creatures of
federal and state, rather than municipal, legislatures. As such, accountability to the affected electorate of both the judges and those
who vest them with such sentencing provisions is more diffused. Considering the delicate nature of this aggressive crime-fighting device,
and the many dangers inherent in its implementation, electoral accountability is one of exclusionary zoning's greatest assets and should
not be diluted by misallocation to the judiciary.
Second, the police who walk the affected streets can offer greater
insights into the social landscape of the exclusion zones, allowing for
more nimble, apt, and timely distribution of exclusion notices. The
hands-on knowledge of beat cops makes effective application of trespass-zoning possible. As Professor Robert C. Ellickson suggests: "[A]
city's first-best approach is .

.

. to employ trustworthy police officers

and to give them significant discretion."' 92 Of course, legitimate concerns may be raised that the police are not dispassionate in this cause
to clean up drug-ridden streets, and perhaps, to counter their susceptibility to over-zealous exercise of their exclusion duties, the neutral
judicial issuance of exclusion notices should be preferred. These concerns can expeditiously be met by delaying the commencement of exclusion until the state's prosecution for the underlying charge survives
a probable cause hearing, thus ensuring that a neutral adjudication of
the exclusion will be reached in every individual's case. If the underlying charge cannot stick, then that charge will be dropped or dismissed, and the exclusion will disappear with it. The judiciary will
thus supplement the good judgment of the police.
What areas may be designated as exclusion zones? The limits to the
actual size of the exclusion zones are worth noting. Just how big can
these exclusion zones be? Certainly, they can extend no farther than
the city limit-the municipal authority's jurisdiction extends only so
far. For fear of treading too far into the taboo realm of banishment,
191 Even the district court in Johnson, which, in ultimately holding the ordinance
unconstitutional, rejected the argument that the zones constituted a reasonable
seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment, "expresse[d] no opinion as to
whether a trial court, in appropriate circumstances, could restrict the right of an individual arrestee or convict from entering an area known for high incidents of crime."
Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 740 n.4 (S.D. Ohio 2000), affd,
310 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2276 (2003). In addition, the
court noted that "a federal district court stated that 'a state court clearly has the right
to restrict the travel of convicted individuals within its jurisdiction."' Id. at 740 (quoting Jones v. Evans, 932 F. Supp. 204, 207 (N.D. Ohio 1996)) (emphasis added by
Johnson court).
192 Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers,
Skid Rows, and Public Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1173 (1996).
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the zones cannot comprise the whole city. First and foremost, as is the
case in Portland and formerly in Cincinnati, the zones must be designated as well-defined areas where there are higher incidents of drug
related crime than in other similarly situated areas within that same
city. By defining the zones' areas in "similarly situated" terms, banishment from the city as a whole would not be possible, as the zones
would be designated through their relation to other areas not in need
of such zoning. As incidents of crime decrease in those areas as a
result of the zoning, the areas would be brought to crime levels more
19 3
proportionate to the levels of other similarly situated areas.
This selection by proportion of crime also ties into the "Broken
Windows" theory of crime that provides the overall justification for
exclusionary zoning. The zoning, by excluding those individuals
whose presence would create physical or social disorder, facilitates the
restoration of those areas otherwise unable to break the self-perpetuating cycle of crime. Left to neighboring areas enabled by a physical
order that inhibits social disorder, excluded individuals find communities more immune to the otherwise deleterious effects of their
presence.
The "Broken Windows" theory of crime also emphasizes the need
to extend the individual's exclusion not only to the zone in which he
or she has been apprehended, but also to all designated drug exclusion zones. This universal exclusion has not been embraced by the
Portland ordinance, where police currently are given discretion to exclude from one or more zones if not all, and the City Council considered a proposal in May 2002 to limit "the area of banishment to the
zone where the person was initially arrested, instead of banishing the
person from all drug-free zones" in order to insulate zones from further civil rights challenges.' 94 Such gaps in exclusion leave not only
the equally endangered neighborhoods susceptible to the ill effects of
an individual only partially excluded, but also the individual susceptible to recidivism by leaving open avenues supportive of his illegal
trade. In both events, the failure to apply exclusion evenly across the
neighborhoods in need would defeat the underpinnings of trespasszoning, and, for this reason, the exclusion from one must mean an
exclusion from all similarly situated.

193

Franzen, supra note 28 (reporting that one of Portland's drug exclusion zones

was slated to "disappear ... apparently a victim of its own effectiveness. City officials
say drug arrests there have dropped to the point that the .

warranted.").
194 Id.

.

. zone is no longer
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How broad must zone variances be? While the importance of broad
variances reflecting legitimate purposes for excluded individuals to
enter the drug exclusion zones has been discussed above in regard to
assisting the zones in surviving strict scrutiny, under the principles of
bail, parole, and probation they simply serve to demonstrate good policy. Variances for legitimate purposes allow the zones to be flexible
and responsive to all concerns raised by this aggressive crime-control
device. They allow the zones to respond to important civil rights concerns and implications without sacrificing the needs of the communities for which the zones are designed to protect and restore. The
variances should be enumerated in advance within the drug exclusion
zone ordinance, and they should be made readily available for issue by
police officers, either on the spot and simultaneous with the exclusion
notice, or at a police station in advance of entering the area for nonemergencies. The Portland City Council considered a proposal to this
effect in May 2002 in hopes of insulating the zones from further civil
rights challenges. 19 5 This Portland idea for "instant variances," again
trusting in police discretion and making variances for legitimate purposes more easily attainable by excluded individuals, sufficiently meets
legitimate civil rights concerns while at the same time respecting the
rights of residents living within those zones to live free from inordinate fear of drug crime.
For all the benefits that drug exclusion zones provide within the
confines of the U.S. Constitution, their failure to reach likely recidivists who are beyond conviction, probation, and parole leaves a glaring practical problem for cities seeking to employ trespass-zoning to
fight crime. For this reason, the second, and even more compelling,
municipal utilization of trespass-zoning should be considered and ultimately employed. This second method, enforcing trespass policies
that follow on the heels of a municipal conveyance of public streets
and thoroughfares in select neighborhoods to neighborhood property owners, should allow for a broader application of trespass-zoning,
allowing municipalities and neighborhoods to confront the reality of
recidivists head-on.

195 Id. ("[In g]ranting automatic waivers to all banished individuals who can show
a legitimate need to travel in the zones ....
[p]olice would issue the waivers, called
variances, on the spot, along with the exclusion. Banished individuals no longer
would have to go to a police precinct to request an application.").

2003]

B.

TRESPASS-ZONING

A Better Alternative: The Circumspect Solution of Conveying Public
Streets and Sidewalks to Neighborhood Property Owners

To meet the concern undeniably raised by the reality of recidivists and the failure of drug exclusion zones to reach such individuals
once beyond their periods of parole, the role of trespass-zoning in the
fight against drug crime must shift away from designations of public
areas as either open access or restricted access, in favor of wholesale
conversion of those areas from public to private. By doing so, municipalities will enable police to arrest for criminal trespass any individuals
found on those premises who do not have a legitimate purpose for
being there. Police protection of these premises, which extends to
the formerly public thoroughfares, would enforce the private property
rights of the neighborhood property owners without implicating the
constitutional concerns otherwise raised by similar action conducted
pursuant to the enforcement of drug exclusion zones. Municipalities
may legitimately employ trespass-zoning by conveying public streets in
well defined, preexisting neighborhoods to the property owners of
those areas.
This method of trespass-zoning involves the enactment of ordinances by city councils that convey public, city-owned neighborhood
streets and thoroughfares to local, neighborhood property owners. In
so doing, the property owners with title to those streets and thoroughfares would be afforded the right to exclude. By enabling the most
troubled municipal areas to invoke the protections of trespass law,
those neighborhoods will be able both to engage in restoration of
their social and physical order in the same manner made possible by
the drug exclusion zones, and to extend the exclusions to likely recidivists beyond the reach of public drug exclusion zones.
1. Thoroughfare Conveyance To, and Trespass Policy Enforcement
By, Public Housing Authorities
Despite the demonstrated success of trespass policies in reducing
crime when employed within public housing developments, the Virginia Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hicks abrogated the public
thoroughfare conveyance and corresponding trespass policy of the recipient Richmond Housing Authority. 196 It is important to note here
that the conveyance and trespass policy at issue in Hicks involved a
public housing authority-a quasi-governmental entity. 19 7 The govern196 Commonwealth v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674, 681 (Va. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191 (2003).
197 Id. at 676.
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mental posture of such housing authorities carries with it the possibilities of constitutional implications not present in the absence of
governmental action, and therefore merits consideration separate
from similar conveyances to private neighborhood property owners.
It is also important, however, not to gloss over the daunting crime
problems faced by public housing, where "drug dealers 'increasingly
impos[e] a reign of terror on public and other federally assisted lowincome housing tenants.'

''198

Public housing has proven to be the

front line for this second strain of trespass-zoning, and as such provides great insights into its potential for success and strategies for its
implementation both in public and private application. 199
In Hicks, the excluded defendant, who had received written notification of his exclusion from the Housing Authority property prior to
his ultimate apprehension for criminal trespass, mounted a facial challenge to the Housing Authority's trespass procedures and policy, asserting that the measures "inhibit[ed] the exercise of First
Amendment rights [because] the impermissible applications of the
law [were] substantial when 'judged in relation to the [policy's]
plainly legitimate sweep.'"20 0 Having accepted the facial challenge,
the Virginia Supreme Court found that the public housing authority
official who was entrusted with the discretion to determine which individuals had a legitimate purpose for entering the development could
"even prohibit speech that [was] political or religious in nature. ' 20 1
Because "a citizen's First Amendment rights cannot be predicated
upon the unfettered discretion of a government official," the Housing
20 2
Authority's trespass policy was struck down as overly broad.
198 Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127 (2002) (quoting
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 11901(3) (2000)).

199

See Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191 (2003) (rejecting First Amendment chal-

lenge to housing authority trespass policy enveloping streets and sidewalks within a
complex previously conveyed to the public housing authority from the City of Richmond); Vasquez v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 271 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that
public housing authority's trespass policy enveloping the complex's thoroughfares violated the First Amendment by banning door-to-door campaigners from the premises), reh'g granted en banc, 289 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2274
(2003); Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding public housing
authority's list naming individuals to be excluded from premise's streets and sidewalks
based on their likely prior involvement in criminal activities); Daniel v. City of Tampa,
38 F.3d 546 (11 th Cir. 1994) (upholding public housing trespass policy extending to
the streets and sidewalks within a housing development).
200 Hicks, 563 S.E.2d at 681 (Kinser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999) (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973))).
201 Id. at 680-81.
202 Id.
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The dissenting opinion in this six to five decision noted, however,
that the court should not have heard the defendant's facial challenge
to the conveyance and trespass policy. Facial challenges to statutes or,
as at issue here, trespass policies, can proceed under two different
doctrines-overbreadth or vagueness. 20 3 Because the trespass "policy's legitimate sweep prohibit[ed] trespassing, an activity that is not
protected by the First Amendment," and its "legitimate reach
dwarf led] its arguably impermissible applications," the dissent found
that the defendant did not have standing to assert a facial challenge to
the policy under the overbreadth doctrine. 20 4 The dissent also argued
that the defendant could not assert a facial challenge under the
vagueness doctrine, as his conduct in trespassing "was clearly proscribed" both by the policy itself and in the written "no trespass" notice he had previously received. 20 5 Therefore, the Hicks dissent found
that the defendant did not have standing to assert a facial challenge to
the conveyance and corresponding trespass policy under either the
20 6
overbreadth or vagueness doctrines.
In the end, the Hicks dissenters prevailed when the U.S. Supreme
Court, in reversing the Virginia Supreme Court, rejected this facial
challenge to the public housing authority's trespass policy. The Court
found no showing of overbreadth, noting that the defendant "failed to
demonstrate that this notice [of exclusion] would even be given to
anyone engaged in constitutionally protected speech.
'[L]egitimate business or social purpose' evidently includes leafleting
and demonstrating; otherwise, [the public housing official] would
lack authority to permit those activities on [the public housing authority's] property. '20 7 Finding that the trespass policy did not bar entry
for the exercise of any First Amendment activity, the Court held that
203

See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999).
[I]mprecise laws can be attacked on their face under two different doctrines.
First, the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation of laws that
inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when 'judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep." Second, even if an enactment does not reach a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, it may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public
that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty
interests.
Id. (citations omitted).
204 Hicks, 563 S.E.2d at 683 (Kinser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982)).
205 Id. (Kinser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206 Id. (Kinser, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207 Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2003).
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this form of trespass-zoning was not substantially overbroad in relation
20 8
to its plainly legitimate sweep.
The U.S. Supreme Court also found that the trespass policy extending to the streets and sidewalks of the public housing authority
would not even violate the First Amendment as applied to excluded
persons whose purpose for entry would be to engage in constitutionally protected speech. 20 9 In fact, the Court found that such punishment for trespass carried no First Amendment implications
whatsoever:
Even assuming the streets of [the public housing authority] are a
public forum, the notice-barment rule subjects to arrest those who
reenter after trespassing and after being warned not to return-regardless of whether, upon their return, they seek to engage in
speech. Neither the basis for the barment sanction (the prior trespass) nor its purpose (preventing future trespasses) has anything to
do with the First Amendment. Punishing its violation by a person
who wishes to engage in free speech no more implicates the First
Amendment than would the punishment of a person who has (pursuant to lawful regulation) been banned from a public park after
vandalizing it, and who ignores the ban in order to take part in a
political demonstration. Here, as there, it is [defendant's] nonexpressive conduct-his entry in violation of the notice-barment rule210
not his speech, for which he is punished as a trespasser.
The Supreme Court here crystallizes the crucial point behind trespasszoning. As a result of one's prior bad behavior, and pursuant to lawful regulation, the extent of an individual's constitutional rights may
be legitimately circumscribed. It is not the exercise of those rights in
general that is abrogated, however, but simply the exercise of those
rights in a particular place. As a creature of trespass law, these measures are not concerned with the purpose of entry, but rather the entry itself. Trespass-zoning is, at its core, a land-based restriction.
Furthermore, the Virginia Supreme Court's holding that the trespass policy contravened the First Amendment was deficient in several
other respects. First, it failed to distinguish the potential duality of
governmental action. In upholding the constitutionality of a public
housing authority's eviction of public housing tenants on the basis of
drug-related criminal activity committed by those tenants' household
members, the U.S. Supreme Court in Department of Housing and Urban
Development v. Rucker distinguished government action as a sovereign
208
209
210

Id. at 2198-99.
Id.
Id.
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from its acts as a proprietor. 21 1 While the Court of Appeals cited cases
suggesting that the housing authority's evictions contravened Fourteenth Amendment Due Process by permitting "tenants to be deprived of their property interest without any relationship to individual
wrongdoing,

'2 12

the Supreme Court found those cases inapposite in

that they centered upon "the acts of government as sovereign."' 2 1 3
Rather, in Rucker, "the government," in the form of the public housing authority, was "not attempting to criminally punish or civilly regulate [the evicted tenants] as members of the general populace. It
[was] instead acting as a landlord of property that it owns, invoking a
clause in a lease to which [the tenants had] agreed. '2 14 As the Court

in Rucker makes clear, the extent to which government action implicates constitutional rights may be contingent upon the nature of government action. Where the government acts "as a landlord of
property that it owns," as did the Richmond Housing Authority in
Hicks, the breadth of constitutional implications is far less wide than
21
when it acts as a sovereign.

5

As the dissent in Hicks noted, the Housing Authority's trespass
policy did not "directly regulate activity protected by the First Amendment, but instead limit[ed] access to government property.''2 16 Limiting access to property to those with a legitimate purpose for being there, for
the purpose of providing a safe, drug-free environment for residents,
is firmly within the bounds of appropriate landlord action, perhaps
even more so than the upheld invocation of a lease clause in Rucker.
As the Supreme Court found in Adderley v. Florida:
211 Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 135 (2002).
212 Rucker v. Davis, 237 F.3d 1113, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238
U.S. 482, 490 (1915)), rev'd, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
213 Rucker, 535 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added).
214 Id.
215 Id. Indeed, the Rucker Court implicitly affirmed Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion in United States v. Kokinda, in which the Court upheld a Postal Service prohibition of soliciting contributions on postal premises-including postal sidewalks.
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 737 (1990). The plurality noted that "[i]t is a
long-settled principle that governmental actions are subject to a lower level of First
Amendment scrutiny when 'the governmental function operating . . . [is] not the
power to regulate or license, as lawmaker, . . . but, rather, as proprietor, to manage
[its] internal operation[s]."' Id. at 725 (plurality opinion) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest.
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961)).
216 Commonwealth v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674, 682 (Va. 2002) (Kinser,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added), rev'd sub nom. Virginia v. Hicks, 123
S. Ct. 2191 (2003).
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Nothing in the Constitution of the United States prevents [the government] from even-handed enforcement of [a] general trespass
statute [with respect to public property]. The State, no less than a
private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under
217
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.
The property under the control of the Richmond Housing Authority
was lawfully dedicated to be used for residential purposes, and evenhanded enforcement of its trespass policy to exclude those who did
not have a legitimate purpose for being in the buildings or on the
streets and sidewalks owned by the Housing Authority fall squarely
within the authority's proprietary power as set forth by Adderley.
The Adderley decision notwithstanding, "[t] he Government, even
when acting in its proprietary capacity, does not enjoy absolute freedom from First Amendment constraints." 218 Recognizing that "the
standards by which limitations upon [a right of access to public property] differ depending on the character of the property at issue," the
Court in Peny Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association
announced a forum-based approach to determining the constitutionality of such governmental restrictions.2 1 9 The Court identified three
types of government-owned property: (1) traditional public fora,
"which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate"; (2) "property which the State has opened for
use by the public as a place for expressive activity"; and (3) nonpublic
fora, "which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication." 2 20 Noting that the "First Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the
government," the Supreme Court held that "the State may reserve [a
nonpublic] forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
22 1
the speaker's view."
Public Housing developments are widely recognized as nonpublic
fora. In enforcing similar no-trespass restrictions of a Tampa public
housing authority against a leafleteer, the Eleventh Circuit found:
The official mission of the Housing Authority is to provide safe
housing for its residents, not to supply non-residents with a place to
disseminate ideas. Further, in practice, access to Housing Authority
217 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
218 Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 725 (plurality opinion).
219 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
220 Id. at 45-46.
221 Id. at 46 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129, 131 n.7 (1981)).
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property is carefully limited to lawful residents, their invited guests,
and those conducting official business. We therefore have little difficulty concluding that the Housing Authority property is a nonpublic forum.

222

Though public housing developments such as that in Hicks may be
comprised of many buildings adjoined by several streets and sidewalks, that does not preclude such complexes from nonpublic fora
categorization. Even a Fifth Circuit ruling hostile to a trespass policy
similar to that at issue in Hicks recognized in Vasquez v. Housing Authority of El Paso that "[c]haracterizing [a unit owned by the El Paso,
Texas Housing Authority] as a public forum simply because of its
streets and sidewalks ... would be inconsistent with our understand' 223
ing of the Court's forum analysis jurisprudence."
Having placed public housing developments that envelop streets
and sidewalks within the category of nonpublic fora, it must now be
asked whether the Richmond Housing Authority's trespass policy, insofar as it regulates speech by enabling a public official in the course
of assessing legitimate presence purposes to "prohibit speech that is
political or religious in nature," 224 was "reasonable and not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view."'2 25 This calls for an examination of the policy's reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.
Although the Virginia Supreme Court in Hicks completely
avoided forum analysis, other courts passing on similar exclusion policies have recognized the viewpoint neutrality of such measures. The
Fifth Circuit found that the El Paso housing authority's trespass measures, which excluded a political candidate, were "viewpoint neutral
because they appl[ied] to all nonresidents who [sought] to go doorto-door distributing literature," and prohibited such "campaigning regardless of party affiliation or the viewpoint espoused by the nonresident." 226 The Tampa Housing Authority's trespass policy that led to

the arrest of the leafleteer in Danielwas found viewpoint-neutral be222 Daniel v. City of Tampa, 38 F.3d 546, 550 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Kokinda, 497
U.S. at 727).
223 Vasquez v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 271 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 2001); see also
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) ("The presence of sidewalks and
streets within the [military] base did not require a finding that it was a public forum.") (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835-37 (1976)), reh'ggranteden banc, 289
F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 2274 (2003).
224 Commonwealth v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674, 680-81 (Va. 2002) (emphasis added),
rev'd sub nom. Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191 (2003).

225 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (quoting United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
226 Vasquez, 271 F.3d at 203-04.
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cause there was "no evidence that the police arrested [the leafleteer]
because they disagreed with his message. '227 As the dissent in Hicks
noted, the Richmond Housing Authority's trespass policy was an effort
to "prohibit[ ] trespassing" and "limit[ ] access to government property" for the greater end of providing a "safe, drug-free environment"
for its residents. 228 The trespass policy was in no way directed at suppressing expression, and thus passed the viewpoint-neutral prong of
this test in that it applied equally to all non-residents, regardless of
their message.
Greater controversy arises when considering the reasonableness
of public housing trespass policies. In Daniel, the Tampa Housing Authority's exclusion of the leafleteer was found reasonable not only as a
"means of combating the rampant drug and crime problems within
the Housing Authority property," but also because the leafleteer had
"unlimited access to the City-owned streets and sidewalks adjacent to
the housing complex, allowing him an alternative means for distributing information to residents." 2 29 Such access to adjacent thoroughfares also featured prominently in the Vasquez trial court's finding that
the El Paso Housing Authority's trespass policy excluding a political
230
candidate was reasonable.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Vasquez, however, was unmoved by the availability of alternative access, finding the trespass
measures of the El Paso Housing Authority unreasonable because "the
citizens who reside in the [public housing] developments deserve access to political information in the same manner as other citizens of El
Paso." 2 31 Unfortunately, the court of appeals ignored the trial court's
cogent point that all of the public housing residents retained "the unfettered right to invite any political candidate to [their] residence[s]
to discuss that individual's candidacy, without running afoul of the
rules." 232 Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit's Vasquez decision is but a minor setback to trespass-zoning. In striking down the El Paso Housing
Authority's trespass measures as applied to the door-to-door politi227 Daniel, 38 F.3d at 550.
228 Hicks, 563 S.E.2d at 682, 683, 685 (Kinser, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
229 Daniel,38 F.3d at 550.
230 Vasquez v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 103 F. Supp. 2d 927, 933 (W.D. Tex. 2000)
("The Court further notes that [the excluded individual] has access to the city-owned
streets and sidewalks which are adjacent to [the housing authority's] complexes, and
in some instances, are contained within those complexes, to disseminate his political
message."), rev'd, 271 F.3d 198 (5th Cir. 2001), reh'g granted en banc, 289 F.3d 350 (5th
Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2274 (2003).
231 Vasquez, 271 F.3d at 204.
232 Vasquez, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
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cian, the court offered a means to resuscitate the policy in a manner
that would notjeopardize the housing authority's proprietary interest
of protecting its residents from nonresident crime:
Although [the El Paso Housing Authority's] outright ban on doorto-door campaigning by nonresidents is unreasonable, requiring political campaigners to seek the same authorization as other individuals that have 'legitimate business on the premises' would be
reasonable in light of [the Housing Authority's] goals of preventing
crime by nonresidents.

233

Thus, as was the case with drug exclusion zones, the viability of thoroughfare conveyance may depend upon the extent to which this trespass-zoning measure allows for otherwise-excluded individuals to gain
entry into protected zones for the purpose of conducting legitimate
activities therein. Requiring public housing authorities to open up
their premises to political or religious solicitors, provided that those
solicitors, like all other nonresidents, first report to the proper official
for clearance and produce "sufficient credentials," 234 would not ham-

per these communities from fighting drug crime and facilitating a safe
and drug-free neighborhood. In reflecting on its Vasquez ruling, the
Fifth Circuit admitted that "in [Daniel], the Eleventh Circuit reached
an opposite conclusion with respect to a nearly identical statute." 2 35
But regardless of which line of reasoning is followed-be it the more
lenient Eleventh Circuit or the more demanding Fifth-the legitimacy
of public housing trespass policies extending to development streets
and sidewalks survives First Amendment scrutiny.
Furthermore, public housing authority trespass policies extending to development streets and sidewalks also survive Fourteenth
Amendment substantive and procedural due process challenges. In
fact, they have done so in the even more poignant circumstances
found in Knoxville, where the trespass policy was not a blanket restriction of all nonresidents without a legitimate purpose for being on the
premises, as seen in Richmond, Tampa, and El Paso, but rather an
exclusion directly targeted at specifically named individuals based on
reliable information that linked those individuals to certain criminal
activities. The Sixth Circuit upheld the Knoxville public housing authority's no-trespass list against, among other challenges, a substantive
and procedural due process challenge by one of the excluded individuals who had been arrested for criminal trespass in violation of the
233
234
235

Vasquez, 271 F.3d at 205.
Id.
Id.
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policy. 2 36 The Thompson court rejected the Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process challenge asserting that the policy "violate [d]
[the excluded individual's] right to enter into and maintain certain
intimate or private relationships" with family members who lived in
the development because such visits do not constitute a fundamental
right. 2 37 Furthermore, the court held that the excluded individual's
"claimed interest [was] not sufficient to require procedural due process protection" because, in contrast to the Knoxville housing authority's "mandate[ ] [under] Tennessee law to provide its residents a safe
place to live," the trespasser could neither establish that "his visits
[were] welcome" nor that "his ability to visit with [family members]
w[ould] be substantially limited if he [could] not visit them in that
particular place." 238 In the absence of an established fundamental
right or significant private interest, individuals, excluded from the
streets and sidewalks of public housing developments cannot successfully assert a substantive or procedural due process right to perambulate on those thoroughfares.
2.

Thoroughfare Conveyance To, and Trespass Policy Enforcement
By, Preexisting Communities Comprised of Individually Owned
Units

As the discussion above confronting the legal challenges to the
conveyance of public thoroughfares to public housing authorities
demonstrates, such use of trespass-zoning is not only constitutional,
but also effective. Furthermore, its legitimacy need not be limited to
public housing developments, and should in fact be extended to preexisting neighborhoods that choose to avail themselves of these effective problem-oriented solutions to street crime. While private
neighborhoods can employ trespass-zoning over conveyed streets and
sidewalks with far less legal implications than public housing authorities, the procedural impediments in its implementation are exponentially greater. Unlike public housing authorities, for private
neighborhoods to utilize these trespass-zoning protections, a group of
individual property owners must collectivize to take joint custody of
their adjoining streets and sidewalks; these owners must allocate own236 Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407-08 (6th Cir. 2001).
237 Id. at 406-07.
238 Id. at 408. "[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as of the private interest that has
been affected by governmental action." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970)
(quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
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ership and the duties that come with it; and they must subsequently
enforce the protective trespass policies. While these transaction costs
are high, they are not insurmountable, as scholars such as George W.
Liebmann, Robert C. Ellickson, and Robert H. Nelson make clear in
setting forth a procedural checklist for preexisting communities to
23 9
utilize in going private.
Of course, the privatization of formerly public spaces properly
raises a raft of civil rights concerns. However,just as gated communities are subject to the rule of law, so too will be those preexisting
neighborhoods that choose to avail themselves of this trespass-zoning
240
strain-for "a well-developed body of law" will be readily at hand.
As Professor Ellickson states:
The operation of a [privatized preexisting neighborhood] would involve a fistful of legal issues. Fortunately the law of homeowners
associations and other [residential community associations] can be
consulted for guidance. Community association law provides precedents on, among other issues: procedures for electing directors; duties of directors; record-keeping and access to records; judicial
review of decision making; amendments of the articles; annexations
and disannexations of territory; and the creation of an umbrella as24 1
sociation that encompasses smaller ones.
239 See Ellickson, supra note 54, at 100-06 (proposing that privatization of neighborhoods be made possible through (1) "Circulation of a Petition" to form a BLID;
(2) "City Consideration of the Petition"; (3) "Submission [of the petition] for Approval in Referendum by Owners of a Supermajority of the District's Assessed Property Value"; (4) provision for the "Ongoing Administration" of the BLID; and (5) the
institution of procedures for termination or "Disestablishment" of the BLID); George
W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and Block Associations, 25 URB. LAW.

335, 382-83 (1993) (pioneering the idea of the urban gated community by proposing
that state governments enact enabling legislation permitting existing neighborhoods
to form block associations upon two-thirds approval by neighborhood residents); Nelson, supranote 49, at 833-34 (providing for neighborhood privatization following (1)
petition of state government to form a neighborhood association by owners owning
more than sixty percent of the neighborhood property value; (2) state government
consideration and approval of the petition under "standards of reasonableness"; (3)
state authorization of the neighborhood to negotiate with the "appropriate municipal
government" for the "transfer of ownership of municipal streets, parks, swimming
pools, tennis courts, and other existing public lands and facilities located within the
proposed newly private neighborhood"; (4) state scheduling of a neighborhood association election upon certifying transfer agreement worked out between state and
local municipality; and (5) state supervision of the election).
240 Ellickson, supra note 54, at 100.
241 Id. at 104 (citing WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAw (2d ed. 1988); ROBERT G. NATELSON,
LAw OF PROPERTY OWNER AssoCIATIONS

(1989)).
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Thus, those victimized by abuses of trespass-zoning conveyances may
still secure redress by availing themselves of a circumspect body of law
that has developed alongside the rise in gated communities.
Professor Nelson has found that "[m]any inner city residents
would like to exclude criminals, hoodlums, drug dealers, truants, and
others who often undermine the possibilities for a peaceful and vital
neighborhood existence there." 242 He notes that "[p] rivate neighborhoods 'virtually guarantee ... greater safety from crime: No criminals
need apply, strangers are stopped before entering, and troublemakers
are easily evicted.' '' 243 Professor Nelson concludes that "[i]n inner
city areas, creation of new private neighborhood associations would
help greatly to improve the quality-including reducing the rate of
crime-in these often deteriorated environments." 244 Professor Ellickson notes that "[t]he resounding success of [residential community associations] in new housing developments suggests the merits of
enabling the stakeholders of inner-city neighborhoods to mimic-at
the block level-the micro-institutions commonly found in the suburbs. '245 In this vein, Professor Nelson laments:
Politically, rather than join the suburbs, civil rights groups and
other organized supporters of inner city residents often seek to undermine suburban powers of exclusion. A wiser approach, could
they overcome their ideological straight jackets, might be to bring
suburban powers of exclusion-the rights of private property, if
246
now in a collective form-into the inner city.
The proposals of both Professors Ellickson and Nelson seek to
explore means to enable preexisting and distressed communities to
reap the advantages long enjoyed by newer and often suburban developments. Together in advancing their proposals for implementation
of their respective neighborhood association or 1BLID, Professors Nelson and Ellickson provide a roadmap for conveying streets and sidewalks to preexisting private neighborhoods that is not only legally
possible and transactionally efficient, but also socially desirable in enabling neighborhoods to fight crime with problem-oriented solutions.

242 Nelson, supra note 49, at 865 (citing Wilson & Kelling, supra note 58, at 29).
243 Id. at 866 (quotingJohn Dilulio,Jr., A More Gated Union, WKLY.STANDARD, July
7, 1997, at 14).
244 Id. at 879.
245 Ellickson, supra note 54, at 109.
246 Nelson, supra note 49, at 866 (citing CHARLES MONROE HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER
SIEGE

(1996);

MICHAEL

N.

DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF

EXCLUSION

(1976)).
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TRESPASS-ZONING

CONCLUSION

Drug exclusion zones work both on the streets and within the
fabric of constitutional law. Even those courts most hostile to such
zoning have in one form or another dispatched most of the constitutional objections raised under double jeopardy and freedom of association challenges. Though a compelling objection to the exclusion
zones has arisen under the purported right to intrastate travel, the
zones nonetheless survive that challenge by meeting it in three different and independently sufficient ways. First, the uncertain existence
of the right to intrastate travel casts doubt on the cogency of challenges based on this purported fundamental freedom. Second, even
if a fundamental right to intrastate travel does exist, the zones, narrowly tailored in combination with their many and broad variances to
meet a compelling governmental interest, are able to withstand the
required and more exacting strict scrutiny. Finally, and most significandy, this form of trespass-zoning bypasses altogether the fray otherwise implicated by the right to intrastate travel when rooted in those
well-established principles upon which bail, probation, and parole are
founded.
The drug exclusion zones' ability to evade constitutional challenges, however, constrains their effective breadth to only those
phases between arrest and trial, and between release and the conclusion of probation or parole. These limitations hamstring the zones by
leaving potential recidivists, who remain a crucial category for exclusion from sensitive areas in their statistically substantial contribution
to both social and physical disorder, outside the zones' reach. Therefore, a more favorable alternative exists in the conveyance of public
streets and sidewalks of logically and well-defined areas to neighborhood property owners. Whether they be public housing authorities or
private associations, such thoroughfare conveyances promise the most
circumspect eradication of drug crime, and crime in general, in those
most severely distressed areas.
To counter the corrosive interplay of social and physical disorder
that is destroying too many of their communities, local municipalities
must aggressively target those dysfunctional areas within their jurisdiction with the same zeal and relentless determination as those who
push the poisons. In offering problem-oriented solutions, these municipalities may finally make great strides in turning this crisis of national magnitude, and spell the beginning of the end for an otherwise
endless cycle.
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